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This thesis analyzes the impact of Sudan’s bilateral relations with the Eritrean and 
Ethiopian governments upon its practice of refoulement of asylum-seekers and refugees 
from those countries. It argues that Sudan uses the asylees from these two states as tools 
and objects of policy. In different contexts and depending on relations between the states 
at a given time, Sudan has used its forced return of these individuals as a means of 
showing support for, as well as disapproval of their home governments. Sudan’s behavior 
also highlights some shortcomings within the international refugee regime and in certain 
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On October 18, 2011 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) publicly condemned Sudan’s refoulement of 300 Eritrean asylum-
seekers and refugees to Eritrea.1 A month later on November 16, 2011 a human rights 
group based in the Ethiopian diaspora issued a report decrying Sudan’s recent arrest and 
refoulement of a former Ethiopian opposition party member.2 These echo sporadically 
repeated reports of Sudan’s refoulement of Ethiopian and Eritrean asylum-seekers and 
refugees over the past two decades. A refugee is a person outside his or her country of 
origin who cannot return due to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”3 
Individuals are also protected by the concept of non-refoulement, that a state may not 
return a person to a country where he or she will face a threat to life or freedom.4 The 
Government of Sudan violates the principle of non-refoulement despite its being party to 
international and regional conventions, which bind it to the protection of asylum-seekers 
and refugees as enshrined in international human rights law and customary international 
law.  
                                                
1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “UNHCR dismay at new 
deportation of Eritreans by Sudan,” briefing notes, UNHCR, October 18, 2011, 
http://www.unhcr.org/4e9d47269.html. 
2 Solidarity Committee for Ethiopian Political Prisoners (SOCEPP), “Ethiopian Dissident 
Deported by the Sudan,” unpublished report, SOCEPP, November 16, 2011, 
http://www.socepp.de/ethiopian-dissident-deported-by-the-sudan.pdf. 
3 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, A(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150. 
4 Ibid., art. 33. 
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The Eritrean government considers seeking asylum an act of treason, and failed 
asylum-seekers face a high risk of incommunicado detention and subjection to torture 
upon return to Eritrea.5 While the Ethiopian government does not implement as severe a 
blanket policy to forced returnees, opposition party members and government critics as 
well as those suspected of involvement in certain ethnically based liberation movements 
are at risk of arbitrary and indefinite detention, torture, and extrajudicial execution upon 
return to Ethiopia.6 
Sudan is not alone in the international community in violating international law 
with regard to refugees, and from state to state the reasons for violations vary. Countries’ 
putting their own interests or foreign policies ahead of international law is also by no 
means a recent phenomenon and is a major factor hindering uniform implementation of 
the law. Despite these realities this issue does deserve further scholarship, especially as it 
has not been paid due attention in the context of the Sudanese government.  
This thesis examines the impact of bilateral relations between refugee sending and 
receiving states upon treatment of refugees, using the Horn of Africa as a region of study. 
Specifically, the cases of Sudan’s bilateral relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea, and 
correspondingly, Sudan’s practice of refoulement of refugees and asylum-seekers from 
the two respective countries are presented and analyzed. I argue that despite Sudan being 
bound to the principle of non-refoulement under international, regional and domestic law, 
the State acts in violation of this law with regard to Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees and 
asylum-seekers, due primarily to its bilateral relations with Ethiopian and Eritrean 
                                                
5 Amnesty International (AI), Eritrea: Sent Home to Detention and Torture, 9-10. 
6 AI, Ethiopia: Prisoners of Conscience, 51-52; Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Hostages 
to Peace,’ 42-44. 
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governments. This study tackles three primary questions: 1) Have Sudan’s bilateral 
relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea significantly influenced its refugee policy toward 
individual Ethiopians and Eritreans; 2) What other factors may be underlying Sudan’s 
deportations of these populations; and 3) What can we learn about international refugee 
law, its realistic application, or shortcomings based on the findings of this study? 
1.1 Significance and Scope of the Study 
The actions carried out by the Sudanese government have had and continue to have 
a great impact on the wellbeing and safety of already-vulnerable asylum-seekers and 
refugees fleeing Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is not enough that these actions simply be 
condemned in the international community; greater steps ought to be taken to understand 
and ideally, address the root causes of this practice. Keeping in mind that individual lives 
are greatly impacted and threatened by refoulement, I have attempted when possible to 
keep central to this study the voices of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees who have 
experienced and witnessed Sudan’s policies firsthand.  
In order to fully address my questions, I present my argument based on qualitative 
and quantitative analyses of historical and contemporary evidence, statistics, and 
information gathered during interviews. It is not within the scope of this research to 
measure the extent to which Sudan’s practice of non-refoulement occurs; it is sufficient 
to establish that it does occur, at least in part, because of Sudan’s political and foreign 
relations concerns. Issues such as the Sudanese authorities’ detention, harassment, and 
other mistreatment of asylum-seekers and refugees would also be useful factors to 
consider in assessing Sudan’s overall treatment of these populations. Though these 
factors will occasionally be brought into our discussion, this study focuses specifically on 
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Sudan’s practice of refoulement. It would be an arduous task and one beyond the means 
and resources available, to collect sufficient and conclusive data regarding acts of 
detention and other differential treatment. 
The primary time period within which this thesis focuses is 1991 to 2011. 1991 
was a year of major transition in both Ethiopia and Eritrea; Eritrea’s war of liberation 
from Ethiopia ended in 1991 (although de jure independence was gained through a 1993 
referendum) and Ethiopians saw the fall of the Derg Regime and the rise to power of the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Using 1991 as the 
beginning of my timeframe of reference, I will be able to analyze the previously 
federated Ethiopia and Eritrea as separate entities. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
policies and practices of the Republic of South Sudan since its July 2011 establishment 
are not included in this study. Reference to events that occurred both before and after July 
2011 will only be considered in the context of policies sanctioned in Khartoum by the 
Republic of Sudan.  
1.2 Methodology 
I became aware of my research issue through conversations I had in 2011 and 2012 
with Eritrean and Ethiopian asylum-seekers and colleagues at Africa and Middle East 
Refugee Assistance (AMERA) who had previously sought asylum in Sudan. While their 
stories and experiences were unique, I noticed trends in their descriptions of Sudan’s 
treatment of asylees from their home countries. These ranged from accounts of those who 
had heard rumors of deportation and poor treatment by the Sudanese authorities or 
subversive targeting by home country officials, to first-hand stories from those who had 
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witnessed or been the victims of such acts. While some could make guesses as to why 
this occurred, many had no solid evidence to substantiate their claims and opinions. 
Therefore, it was necessary for me to approach this research cognizant of my 
existing conceptualization of the subject based primarily on others’ understanding of it. 
To achieve this I employed both qualitative and quantitative methods when carrying out 
my study, as the shortcomings of each method can be compensated for by the other to 
ensure that data is reliable and holistic.7 The quantitative component of this study is 
based on statistics and other measurable data based on desk research, which was 
supplemented for analytical purposes with qualitative observations based on historical 
and contemporary evidence and the accounts of interviewees. 
1.2.1 Conceptual Approach 
In approaching my research problem, I viewed the subjects of my study – that is, 
Sudanese government policies toward its neighbors, as well as the individual lives of 
refugees impacted by these policies – as parts of an interconnected system that both 
influence and are influenced by one another. In 1985 Ferris provided a useful approach to 
the study of refugees that espoused: (1) identifying trends within refugee movements 
which may initially appear sporadic, (2) viewing the field as a means of gaining insight 
into the international political system, (3) as well as a means to analyze policy-making 
processes within specific nations, and (4) acknowledging that the refugee policy-making 
process occurs at a conjunction between international and domestic politics.8 As Betts 
and Loescher suggest, I framed my thoughts from a ‘top-down’ approach that views the 
                                                
7 Matveev, “Advantages of Employing Quantitative and Qualitative Methods.” 
8 Ferris, “Overview: Refugees and World Politics,” 8. 
 6 
forced migrant as both a reflection and integral part of a broader international system.9 I 
carried out this study understanding the refugee to be both a product of and determining 
factor within this system of international foreign policies and relationships. 
1.2.2 Interviews and Sampling Methods 
 Two interviews were carried out with Ethiopian refugees in Egypt who had 
previously sought asylum and spent significant periods of time in Sudan. I originally 
intended to conduct approximately six interviews with Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees, 
as well as several additional interviews with employees of UNHCR and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) based in Sudan. I received confirmation from 
several informants that they would participate in interviews. The reasons these interviews 
were not carried out include scheduling conflicts, a change of heart or fear for personal 
security on the part of the informant, or a loss of contact. I conducted an interview with 
one Eritrean refugee, but it is not included in this study because the information provided 
did not seem reliable or consistent with historical and contemporary facts. In order to 
compensate for this lack of personal interviews, I have included in this thesis the 
accounts of Ethiopian and Eritrean asylees and employees of UNHCR that were provided 
in interviews conducted by various NGOs. 
For the interviews I did conduct, a combination of purposive and snowball sampling 
methods were used to select the informants. Taking a purposive approach to identifying 
interview subjects was the most appropriate method, as I deliberately sought individuals 
with a certain set of experiences and knowledge regarding the research subject. This is 
the most successful form of sampling when interviews are occurring in conjunction with 
                                                
9 Betts and Loescher, “Refugees in International Relations,” 3-4. 
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data review and analysis, as was the case in my research.10 In order to access these 
individuals, I employed the method of snowball sampling; that is, gaining exposure to 
and accessing “informants through contact information that is provided by other 
informants.”11 This method can be particularly useful when attempting to identify ‘hidden 
populations’ such as the individual Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees I interviewed.12  
I received approval from the American University in Cairo Internal Review Board 
(IRB) prior to contacting and interviewing participants.13 All interviews carried out with 
refugees were in-depth and open-ended in nature. It was necessary to conduct in-depth 
interviews with a small number of individuals, as my aim was to gain a thorough 
understanding of the experiences, opinions, and perspectives of individuals to 
substantiate and bring life to the other primary data I gathered.14 The potentially biased 
nature of respondents’ comments and input is acknowledged and therefore, the findings 
based on these interviews are not considered definitive or general in nature, but serve as 
supplements to my other data.15  
1.2.3 Cairo, Egypt 
These interviews occurred in different locations in Cairo, Egypt in August 2012. 
Cairo was an ideal location because of its close proximity to Sudan and large population 
of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees. In January 2012 the UNHCR office in Cairo reported 
that there were 1,612 Ethiopian and 1,987 Eritrean asylum-seekers and refugees residing 
                                                
10 Mack et al., Qualitative Research Methods, 15. 
11 Noy, “Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling,” 5. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See appendix 1. 
14 Boyce and Neale, Conducting In-Depth Interviews, 3. 
15 Ibid., 3-4. 
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in Egypt.16 I also felt that Egypt was a more appropriate location than Sudan to carry out 
interviews primarily out of consideration for the safety and comfort of the refugee 
interviewees. These individuals would be more willing to speak freely and openly on this 
subject in the more removed location of Cairo, compared with Khartoum.  
Furthermore, as the city in which I have studied and lived for two years, Cairo 
was a convenient location from which to gather information for the thesis. I was able to 
use my familiarity with the local refugee populations, community-based and other 
refugee assistance organizations, and personal contacts as a foundation from which to 
gain advice and input prior to beginning my study and to support me throughout the 
process. Experiences, knowledge gained, and relationships I made while interning at the 
local refugee assistance NGO, AMERA, between July 2011 and March 2012 were also 
invaluable resources throughout the study. 
1.2.4 Interviewees 
The purpose of interviews was to enrich the findings of my own research with the 
individual personal anecdotes, experiences, and insights of some of those affected by 
Sudan’s policies. Participants were given an explanation of the purpose of the study and 
gave verbal consent to be interviewed after reviewing the consent form.17 The first 
interview I conducted was with Girma, an Ethiopian refugee who is an employee of a 
Cairo-based refugee assistance organization.18 In the interview he described his 
experiences as a refugee in Sudan from 1988 to 1996, and also gave his personal opinion 
                                                
16 UNHCR, “UNHCR Egypt Fact Sheet, January 2012,” UNHCR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/4f4c956c9.html. 
17 See appendix 2. 
18 For the interview summary, see appendix 3. Girma [pseudonym], interview by the 
author, tape recording, August 9, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.  
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and insights into Ethiopian-Sudanese relations. The second interview was conducted with 
Daniel, an Ethiopian refugee who spent twenty-two years as a refugee in Sudan.19 His 
experiences and insights as a politically active refugee shed much light on the unique 
issues that this specific refugee population has dealt with in Sudan. 
1.2.5 Desk Research 
Desk research focused on the following subjects: 1) legal instruments, specifically 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1969 Organization of 
African Unity Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 
and Sudan’s 1974 Regulation of Asylum Act;20 2) the bilateral relations-refugee policy 
nexus; 3) the modern histories of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan, as well as trends in 
Sudan’s relationship with the two states; 4) statistics on the number of Ethiopian and 
Eritrean refugees in Sudan; and 5) qualitative and quantitative data regarding Sudan’s 
refoulement of these populations. 
All of these components were analyzed in conjunction in order to establish a 
broad, general understanding of the legality of Sudan’s treatment of the asylees it hosts, 
as well as the interplay between Sudan’s bilateral relations with the two case states. An 
in-depth study of significant fluctuations in Sudan’s policy toward Ethiopia and Eritrea 
between 1991 and 2011 was also undertaken. I considered foreign visits between state 
officials, the signing of bilateral agreements, and coordination between Sudan and the 
                                                
19 For the interview summary, see appendix 4. Daniel [pseudonym], interview by the 
author, August 30, 2012, Cairo, Egypt. 
20 189 U.N.T.S. 150; Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa. Sept. 10, 1969. 1001 U.N.T.S. 45; Regulation of Asylum Act 1974. Democratic 
Republic of Sudan Official Gazette No. 1162 at 183 (May 21, 1974). 
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two states as indicators of good or improved relations. Alternately, I considered Sudan’s 
support for Eritrean and Ethiopian opposition movements and the cutting of diplomatic 
ties to be markers of poor or worsening relations.  
This was carried out on top of a broader study of relations between Sudan and 
Ethiopia, and Sudan and pre-independence Eritrean liberation organizations between 
roughly 1960 and 1990. Establishing a strong understanding of the historical context 
from which present-day relations were formed allowed for a more accurate assessment of 
current trends in bilateral relations. The numbers of Ethiopian and Eritrean asylum-
seekers and refugees in Sudan deported in given years were then analyzed against shifts 
in Sudan’s policy toward the two home countries.21  
1.3 Ethical Concerns and Limitations 
The primary obstacles in collecting data for this study were the secretive nature in 
which refoulement is carried out in Sudan, as well as navigating the constantly changing, 
nuanced, and often contradictory trends in Sudan’s policies toward the Ethiopian and 
Eritrean governments. As the Sudanese government does not publicize data on the 
numbers of individuals it refoules each year, I depended primarily on reports from 
agencies such as the UNHCR and U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
(USCRI) to get a general, but by no means complete picture of the numbers of 
deportations. 
Another limitation I faced was not being able to carry out as many interviews as I 
had originally intended. Though I do not feel that the findings of these interviews would 
                                                
21 The term “deportation” refers to a state’s expulsion of an alien from its territory. In this 
study, the term is used at times to refer to the physical act of forcibly returning would-be 
or failed asylum-seekers, asylum-seekers, and refugees.  
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have changed the outcome or final conclusion of this thesis, they could have provided 
additional support and evidence for my arguments. 
The primary ethical issue I faced involved interviewing refugees who had 
previously sought asylum in Sudan. Although I spoke with these individuals in Egypt, I 
am aware that there is fear in the Ethiopian and Eritrean refugee communities in Cairo 
that some negative practices carried out by Sudanese officials (or by authorities from 
their home countries operating in Sudan) also occur in Egypt. This may have made them 
weary of participating in my research. At all levels of the informant-identifying and 
interview process, steps were taken to ensure that the identity of and information 
provided by participants was kept confidential. Consent was obtained in a fully informed 
and voluntary manner. 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
 This introductory chapter has provided readers with an explanation of my thesis 
and the means through which this study was carried out. Chapter 2 is a review of 
literature on key concepts related to foreign policy and bilateral relations, the foreign 
policy-refugee policy nexus, and the role of politics in the application of international 
refugee law. The work of scholars who have addressed this issue specifically in the Horn 
of Africa is also reviewed in this chapter. 
An introduction to basic principles of international refugee law is given in chapter 
3. The concepts of non-refoulement and the outlaw of torture are specifically explored 
because of their key relevance to this study. Broad trends in African asylum policies, and 
regional asylum treaties and legislation are also outlined. Chapter 4 gives a historic and 
modern overview of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan. These two chapters will give readers a 
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basic understanding of the subject at hand, as well as a greater appreciation for why the 
connection between bilateral relations and refugee policy in this region deserves further 
study. 
 Chapters 5 and 6 are case studies of Sudan’s policies of refoulement toward 
Ethiopian and Eritrean asylum-seekers and refugees based on its relations with their 
home governments. The overall findings of my research based on statistics, historical and 
contemporary evidence, and interviews are presented and analyzed in these chapters. This 
includes specific focus on Sudan’s relations with the two states, information about 
specific acts of refoulement, as well as refugees’ personal accounts of their asylum 
experiences in Sudan. The role that shortcomings within the international refugee regime 






 This chapter explores several key concepts required in order to tackle the 
research questions in this thesis. Section 2.1 introduces readers to basic concepts of 
foreign policy and foreign policy analysis. Broad tenets of foreign policy are relevant to 
construct an understanding of more specific bilateral relations between two states, as is 
the focus of this thesis. Section 2.2 reviews previous scholarship on the foreign policy-
refugee policy nexus. Through international refugee law, which is discussed more 
thoroughly in chapter 3, states are obliged to offer asylees protection, without being 
swayed by politicized considerations based on relations with an asylum-seeker’s state of 
origin. Politicized refugee definitions, acceptance policies, or treatment of refugees are 
“contrary to the concept of refugee as it has evolved in international law”, however in 
reality states often do allow political factors to influence asylum policies.22 The example 
of the United States of America’s politicized refugee policies is presented here to 
highlight this issue. In section 2.3, the work of scholars who have focused on refugee 
issues in the Horn of Africa is presented, and previous studies of the nexus of foreign 
policy and bilateral relations with refugee policy in the regional context explored. 
2.1 What is Foreign Policy? 
 Though a term commonly used when referring to relations between states, 
scholars disagree about the base goals and aims of foreign policy and the factors 
influencing it. Palmer and Morgan note that traditional approaches to the study of foreign 
policy are flawed in their understanding that its primary aim is to safeguard the security 
                                                
22 Suhrke, “Global Refugee Movements,” 169. 
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of the state.23 It is more appropriate to view foreign policy decisions as states’ attempts to 
“protect things that they value” and to make changes within the international system so it 
is aligned with their wants and needs.24 Foreign policy analysts are fundamentally 
attempting to explain and understand “decisions taken by human decision makers with 
reference to or having known consequences for entities external to their nation-state.”25 
Because the ‘state’ is a metaphysical and abstract entity, it cannot be viewed as a decision 
maker; instead agent-oriented and actor-specific approaches must be taken that focus on 
the individuals and groups who determine the policies associated with the state.26  
 Furthermore, what may superficially appear to be a quite straightforward policy 
move has likely been influenced by a myriad of factors that must be viewed as a “bundle” 
and not as independent events or decisions.27 Therefore, scholars attempting to 
understand the roots of a single foreign policy decision must view a variety of individuals 
and groups within a state who shape foreign policy. It must be understood that a single 
decision is likely the result of many factors that may or may not appear to be linked.  
2.2 The Foreign Policy-Refugee Policy Nexus 
The nexus between foreign policy, bilateral state relations, and refugee policy is 
one that has been acknowledged and began to be seriously addressed in academia during 
the 1980s. It was then that Loescher noted that the refugee problem is an “integral part of 
international politics and relations.”28 Politics and interstate relations are inextricably 
                                                
23 Palmer and Morgan, A Theory of Foreign Policy, xi. 
24 Ibid., 2. 
25 Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, 4. 
26 Ibid., 6-7. 
27 Palmer and Morgan, 2. 
28 Loescher, “Refugee Issues,” 3. 
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linked to the refugee experience at all levels of flight, exile, and return.29 Conversely, 
refugees reflect not only domestic problems, but also the major global issues of our 
time.30 The international refugee regime and the international community’s responses to 
refugee flows are also inevitably politically charged.31 This is because, at least in part, 
refugee assistance organizations are funded by wealthy donor states whose interests and 
priorities are often manifested in organizations’ responses to refugee issues.32 
When citizens flee their country of origin to seek refuge they are “voting with 
their feet”, that is, making a statement about their home state’s inability or unwillingness 
to fulfill one of its most fundamental objectives: to protect its population.33 Even when 
the factors leading to flight do not initially appear to be politically motivated, the act 
itself is indeed heavily politicized and the refugee him/herself instantly becomes a 
symbol or representation of the origin state’s inefficiency or incompetence.34 From the 
moment an individual crosses an international border to seek asylum, the host state is 
obligated to protect this individual by both granting them the right to seek asylum and 
practicing non-refoulement. In doing so, the host state is tacitly and inescapably 
acknowledging the political message that this individual carries with him regarding the 
home state’s inability or unwillingness to grant this individual citizen protection. 
Depending on existing relations between the sending and host countries, a host state’s 
reception of refugees may be generous and used as a tool to delegitimize a sending state 
                                                
29 Hocké, “Beyond Humanitarianism,” 41. 
30 Loescher, 1. 
31 Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies,” 366-367. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Loescher, 12; Betts and Loescher, 6. 
34 Haddad, The Refugee in International Society. 
 16 
with which they have poor relations; conversely, refugees may by treated poorly or 
barred from the opportunity to seek asylum in order to maintain friendly relations with 
the sending state.35 Sexton notes that in many Western states, decisions about who ought 
to be deemed a refugee and be granted host state protection “is affected significantly by 
political factors.”36 As is demonstrated in this thesis, this is not a trend unique to Western 
states, despite their being the focus of most scholarship conducted on this subject. 
 The modern international refugee law framework is based on the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which was created in 1951.37 Observing the operation 
of the law since that time, Hathaway describes the law as a ‘compromise’ between the 
sovereign right of states to control the entry of non-citizens and the international 
community’s duty towards people needing protection.38 He further argues that states’ self 
interest and well being have been the primary factors in the formation of their refugee 
policies and practices; in reality, refugee law is in place primarily to manage international 
disputes over forced migration, and not – as is commonly understood – to protect 
refugees themselves.39 This ‘self interest’ is important to consider when analyzing why 
states may allow their foreign policy concerns to impact and influence their refugee 
policies, regardless of international obligations.  
 This thesis argues that at times states use refoulement as an instrument of 
foreign policy despite this being a violation of international law. The relationship 
between foreign policy and refoulement is cyclical and thus on occasion it can be difficult 
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to determine whether refoulement is in response to, or the cause of, deteriorating bilateral 
relations. That is to say, while an act of refoulement may be in response to favorable 
relations with the state of origin, it is equally possible that an act of refoulement is itself 
the means of establishing favorable relations with the state of origin. Conversely, acts of 
non-refoulement may be carried out as a result of already deteriorating bilateral relations, 
or may precipitate hostile relations with the state of origin. This thesis acknowledges this 
circular dynamic and keeps it in mind when analyzing and drawing conclusions about 
bilateral relations between Sudan and Ethiopia and Sudan and Eritrea. 
2.2.1 The Case of the United States 
The United States of America provides a strong example for this nexus, 
specifically in terms of the country’s Cold War foreign policy and staunch anti-
Communist stance. The U.S. did not adopt the 1951 Convention refugee definition into 
law until 1980 and prior to that time it only admitted refugees coming from Communist 
or Middle Eastern countries.40 Even after 1980, the idea that refugee flows from 
Communist countries represented the “bankruptcy of the Communist system” still 
prevailed.41 This greatly influenced the U.S.’s decision to openly receive refugees from 
Cuba, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.42 This was done in part to “embarrass and 
discredit” their home countries’ Communist stance, but can also be attributed to an 
American assumption that “all persons in Communist states are by definition in fear of 
persecution.”43 At the same time, the U.S. implemented divisive measures to bar the large 
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flows of Haitians and Salvadoreans from seeking asylum, as their home countries were 
seen as allies to the U.S. due to their shared anti-Communist position.44 As Keely notes, 
the U.S. example highlights the issue that a state’s determination of what constitutes a 
well-founded fear of persecution “is to a large extent a political decision.”45  
Increasingly since the 1980s, literature focusing on the impact of politics and 
foreign policy on refugee policy has emerged, however these studies have primarily 
focused on Western host states. While much can be learned about the nexus by studying 
the issue in those contexts, this subject needs to be explored further in the Horn of Africa 
region, and specifically Sudan. Furthermore, scholars’ recommendations have not 
materialized into new policies within the international refugee regime, and the problems 
aforementioned continue to manifest themselves and some have worsened with regard to 
contemporary refugee situations.  
2.3 The Horn of Africa 
Although literature dedicated to the foreign policy-refugee policy nexus has 
mainly focused on Western refugee receiving states, several scholars have made great 
contributions to this study in the African – and more specifically, Horn of African – 
context. As Milner notes, many studies on African refugee issues have centered heavily 
on refugees themselves.46 Sufficient attention has not been paid to the role that broad 
political forces play on African states’ asylum policies, nor the impact that foreign policy 
plays in the formation of states’ refugee policies.47  
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Karadawi’s 1999 Refugee Policy in Sudan, 1967-1984 is one of the most 
comprehensive studies of the impact of politics and bilateral relations on Sudan’s refugee 
policies toward Ethiopians and Eritreans. In this work he notes that by the 1960s, no issue 
between Sudan and Ethiopia “produced tension comparable to the refugee problem”, and 
notes that Sudan has viewed refugees as “objects of policy” in its dealings with 
neighboring governments.48 Throughout the work he provides a strong case that Sudan’s 
relations with Ethiopia (and Eritrean separatist movements) impacted its policies toward 
refugees of Ethiopian and Eritrean origin. His discussion ends in 1984, however, and 
does not view the subject in light of Eritrean independence or EPRDF rule in Ethiopia. 
Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo found that in the 1980s, Sudan “used refugees as pawns in 
its external policy”, at times allowing Eritrean forces to operate in Sudanese territory, and 
barring this activity when relations were cordial with the Ethiopian government.49  
The works of Bariagaber and Kibreab have provided the most thorough 
contemporary discussion of refugee issues in the Horn of Africa, focusing primarily on 
the nature of refugee settlements, root causes of flight, and repatriations.50 While 
invaluable resources for understanding refugee issues in the region, these scholars’ works 
rarely touch on the modern foreign policy-refugee policy nexus. Bariagaber’s work has 
touched on the political nature of the region’s refugee crisis and acknowledges that 
domestic, regional, and international politics have had an impact on refugee situations in 
the region.51 He provides recommendations on how international policies could better 
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tackle the interstate actions that negatively impact refugees during flight and return.52 
Missing from his discussion, however, is how these factors impact refugees while in 
exile, and specifically the role they play regarding refoulement. 
Due to the nature of the refugee’s predicament, there has always been a link 
between international politics, individual states’ foreign policies, and refugee policy. 
Studies of this connection have focused primarily on Western states’ differential refugee 
acceptance policies based on domestic and foreign policy. This nexus has not been the 
subject of many studies on African refugee issues. Several scholars have provided 
valuable evidence of the ways in which Sudan’s bilateral relations have impacted its 
policies toward Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in the past, yet this has not been 
sufficiently explored in a contemporary context. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND  
ASYLUM TRENDS IN AFRICA 
 
In order to analyze the bilateral relations-refugee policy nexus in Sudan, the laws 
and principles the State is obliged to abide by in regard to refugees and asylum-seekers 
must be understood. Section 3.1 provides a discussion of international refugee law and 
the principle of non-refoulement. In section 3.2 historic and modern trends in Africa’s 
regional asylum systems are introduced. The formation and structure of both the OAU 
Refugee Convention and Sudan’s domestic asylum law are also presented. 
3.1 International Refugee Law and Non-Refoulement 
 Asylum seekers and refugees have been afforded certain rights and standards of 
treatment under international human rights law (IHRL) and international refugee law 
(IRL). These were developed and agreed upon in the international community through a 
number of treaties, conventions, and customary international law throughout the 
twentieth century. States sometimes treat IHRL and IRL as separate bodies in order to 
justify the provision of minimum standards of treatment to refugees;53 however, as 
human rights apply to everyone, they encompass refugees too. Refugees are thus entitled 
to all human rights, including those not explicitly outlined in IRL. As Edwards 
persuasively argues, when there are inconsistencies between IHRL and IRL, the law that 
provides the highest standard of protection and promotion of dignity applies.54 While 
IHRL and IRL instruments provide for a wide range of rights and standards of treatment 
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that apply to asylum-seekers and refugees, for the purposes of this thesis the most 
relevant components are the right to seek asylum, and the prohibition of refoulement. 
 The right of all human beings to leave and return to their countries of origin, as 
well as to seek asylum from persecution is provided for in the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).55 Both of these documents, as well as the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights bind states to ensure that human rights are 
provided to all individuals within their territory without discrimination based on national 
origin.56 The ICCPR and 1984 Convention Against Torture (CAT) also outlaw torture 
and cruel or inhumane treatment.57 “Torture” refers to any act that intentionally afflicts a 
person with severe physical or mental pain or suffering as a means of punishment, for the 
extraction of a confession, as a form of coercion, or discrimination.58 Explicit in article 
3(1) of the CAT is the principle that states may not return asylees to a country where they 
could face this treatment.59  
3.1.1 The 1951 Convention 
The foundation of IRL is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
Developed in response to post-World War II refugee issues in Europe, the 1951 
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Convention deeply reflected the ideologies and priorities of its predominantly Western 
drafters.60 The 1951 text of the Convention defined a refugee as a person who had fled 
their country “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951.”61 While the 
Convention allowed contracting states to choose whether they wanted to include non-
European refugees in their definition, in reality the Convention was not intended to 
protect those populations.62 By the 1960s it was recognized that new refugee situations 
that “may not fall within the scope of the Convention” had arisen, and the Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter included within ‘1951 Convention’) – 
which removed all spatial and temporal limitations from the refugee definition – was 
established in 1967.63 
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention outlaws refoulement, establishing:  
No Contracting State shall expel or return (" refouler ") a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.64  
 
So crucial is this principle to the integrity of the Convention that signatories may make 
no reservations to article 33.65 As was previously noted, the principle of non-refoulement 
is also explicitly established in the CAT. Madsen-Grahl describes non-refoulement as a 
general principle that all states are obliged to practice regardless of their being party to 
the 1951 Convention.66 Chan argues that the widespread and uniform state practice of 
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non-refoulement and states’ belief that they are legally required to abstain from 
refoulement, makes non-refoulement a doctrine of customary international law.67 By its 
nature customary international law, “must have equal force for all members of the 
international community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any unilateral exclusion 
exercisable at will by any one of them in its own favor”.68 Thus, all states are required to 
observe the non-refoulement obligation whether or not they are party to the 1951 
Convention or the CAT. 
3.2 Asylum in Africa 
 
 The forced migration of people throughout the African continent is by no means 
a modern phenomenon. The period of decolonization in the mid-twentieth century and 
the creation of sovereign states, however, marked a new era of forced movement and 
displacement of individuals throughout Africa. Conflicts linked to the emergence of new 
political powers, modern and arbitrary borders, and the struggles of state building were 
the primary reasons for these massive flows.69  
 During the 1960s and 1970s African governments generally implemented 
generous and open asylum policies. While a number of scholars have attributed early 
open policies to “traditional hospitality,” as Milner and others point out, economic 
incentives from donor states to refugee host states and the calculated political support for 
neighboring liberation movements was a significant driving force behind such open 
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policies.70 Regardless of motives, a respect for non-refoulement despite dire 
circumstances and burdens posed to host states was historically a norm throughout the 
global South.71  
 Since the 1980s, African states have tended to implement more restrictive 
asylum policies, with acts of refoulement and low standards of treatment becoming 
norms.72 This is in part a response to a lack of international financial and physical burden 
sharing that would have addressed the domestic concerns many African states developed 
toward the refugees they hosted. For example, in 1984 the UNHCR faced a financial 
crisis when donors restricted their annual budgets for the organization.73 UNHCR’s 
annual expenditure for Sudan therefore plummeted from $36 million for 1984-1985 to 
$16 million for 1985-1986, and the Sudanese government was pressured to provide more 
financial support for the refugee populations within its territory.74 In the 1990s when 
massive refugee flows were occurring throughout Africa, there was a lack of Western 
interest in addressing the causes of refugee-creating conflicts or adequately responding to 
these refugee crises.75 Africa no longer held the same geopolitical interest that it had for 
Western governments during the Cold War and these states focused their attention and 
funds on more “high profile” conflicts and refugee situations like those in the Balkans.76 
 Wealthy donor states have failed to provide adequate solutions and have not 
shouldered their share of the African refugee burden. Theoretically, states should co-
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operate “to ensure that movements across borders do not place an undue or 
disproportionate burden on receiving States.”77 Practically, however, many Western 
governments increasingly practice burden-shifting, whereby asylum-seekers who have 
already transited through other states are removed to a supposed ‘safe third country.’78 
“Burden-shifting arrangements can deprive persons who are genuine refugees of 
internationally guaranteed rights, including the right to protection against refoulement.”79 
Exclusion procedures whereby would-be asylum-seekers are turned away from countries 
before reaching the border or while in international waters are also on the rise.80 As states 
in the global South often do not have the means to implement these strict ‘non-entrée 
regimes’ seen in the North, they have begun to practice more direct forms of refoulement 
and deterrence of large influxes of asylum-seekers.81 While these factors will not be at 
the focus of this study, they must be acknowledged as part of the global environment 
within which Sudan’s broader refugee policies are formed and implemented. 
3.2.1 The Organization of African Unity Convention 
On May 25, 1963 thirty of the then thirty-two independent African states gathered 
in Addis Ababa to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU).82 The purpose of the 
OAU was to “promote unity and solidarity of the African States”, foster regional and 
international cooperation, “defend sovereignty”, and end colonialism throughout the 
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continent.83 Though many newly independent African states ratified the 1951 
Convention, almost immediately after its formation the OAU acknowledged the need to 
take regional approaches to tackle the ever-growing issue of refugees in Africa.84 Based 
on the findings and recommendations of two committees, it was decided that direct 
responsibility for African refugees should be undertaken by the OAU.85 The organization 
found that the movement and settlement of refugees in host countries was already causing 
tension between origin and host states, and that the root problem regarding asylum and 
refugee settlement was a lack of trust between governments.86 
 The Assembly of Heads of State adopted the OAU Convention Governing 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (referred to hereinafter as the ‘OAU 
Convention’) in September 1969. Concern for the political and security concerns that 
member states had toward hosting refugees was central to the Convention and 
acknowledgement of the burden refugees may place on host states is noted clearly in the 
Preamble.87 The OAU Convention outlaws refoulement and accepts and expands upon 
the 1951 Convention refugee definition, adding that: 
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to 
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 
disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin 
or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in 
order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or 
nationality.88 
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 The preamble of the OAU Convention differentiates between a refugee who 
“seeks a peaceful and normal life” and “a person fleeing his country for the sole purpose 
of fomenting subversion from outside.”89 Central to OAU member states’ psyche during 
the development of Convention and as reflected in other OAU resolutions, was a link 
between refugees and the security of member states – be they countries of origin or 
refuge.90 By making such distinctions between refugees and subversives, the OAU 
Convention gave states much power to determine who should be considered a refugee as 
well as over the treatment of those seeking asylum within their borders. 
3.2.2 The Formation of Asylum Policy in Sudan 
 Sudan’s historic approaches to asylum have been in line with those taken by 
many states in the African continent. During the mid-twentieth century there was little 
difference between Sudan’s approach to refugee policy and that of the OAU.91 Sudan’s 
view of refugees and corresponding treatment of individuals has shifted from seeing them 
as ‘subversives’ to ‘freedom fighters’ to legitimate ‘refugees’ as it has seen fit in 
accordance with its international and domestic policy concerns and interests.92 While 
initially Sudan’s policies toward refugees were driven by more humanitarian 
considerations, these policies later were more motivated by Sudan’s foreign relations.93 
This sub-section provides a brief overview of the trends and factors that shaped Sudan’s 
policies toward refugees throughout the second half of the twentieth century. 
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 Sudan’s modern refugee policies took shape under the governments of Prime 
Minister Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub (1965 – 1969) and Gaafar el-Nimeiry (1969 – 
1984). Refugee policy under Mahjoub was shaped in the context of the recently formed 
OAU standards of “good neighborliness” amongst its member states, as well as the 
emerging southern Sudan liberation struggle against the central government.94 While 
previous governments viewed exiled Eritreans and Congolese who settled in Sudan as 
liberation fighters to be welcomed in the country, the Mahjoub Administration came to 
view these asylees as a threat to national security.95 In 1966 the country officially labeled 
exiled Congolese as “refugees” (as opposed to “revolutionaries”) so that theoretically 
their carrying out political or military activities against their home country would cease to 
be legitimate.96 This was considered central to maintaining Sudan’s own national security 
and in 1967 the Commissioner for Refugees (COR) office was established to implement 
state policies toward refugees.97 In the same period, Sudan welcomed UNHCR to the 
country specifically to provide refugees with material assistance.98 
The el-Nimeiry Government, which preserved most of the previous government’s 
policies toward refugees, ratified the 1951 Convention, enacted the domestic Regulation 
of Asylum Act in 1974, and acceded to the OAU Convention in 1978.99 Sudan’s Asylum 
Act provides a refugee definition in line with that of the OAU Convention.100 The Act, 
however, does not make direct reference to refoulement, the concept so central to both 
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the 1951 and OAU Conventions. Article 7 notes that “any treaty or convention regulating 
the subject of asylum to which the Sudan is party” must be given priority over the 
application of Sudan’s domestic asylum law.101 In any case, Sudan is bound to observe 
the principle of non-refoulement by its international legal obligations under both treaty 
and customary law.  
This chapter has outlined the legal background for this thesis by laying out the 
international, regional, and domestic laws that apply to Sudan and should guide their 
refugee policy. The following chapter provides the historical context for this study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HISTORICAL AND MODERN PERSPECTIVES:  
ETHIOPIA, ERITREA, AND SUDAN 
 
In the postcolonial period, the Horn of Africa (understood to include Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan) has been plagued with ongoing 
unrest as ruling governments have repressed populations who were pursing self-
determination through ideological and ethnic-based liberation movements. It is a unique 
region in which to study the intersection between bilateral relations and refugee policy 
because for over the past half-century, the liberation movements within each of these 
states have often been supported by other neighboring state actors in the region. At 
different periods, states have viewed the refugee populations within their borders as 
freedom fighters or alternatively as rebels. Furthermore, most of the countries in the 
region are both major refugee sending and receiving states and, to date, are home to large 
protracted refugee situations. 
In 2004, refugees originating from Horn of Africa states constituted seven of the 
thirty-three worldwide, protracted refugee situations; that is, Sudanese refugees in 
Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and Uganda; Somali refugees in Kenya 
and Yemen; and Eritrean refugees in Sudan.102 In 1986 the Horn of Africa produced the 
largest number of refugees in the whole of the continent, and refugees originating from 
the region have continued to account for a significant and disproportionate number of 
African refugees.103 In 2011, refugees and asylum-seekers originating from the Horn of 
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Africa accounted for over half of African refugees and asylees, and made up 
approximately 19% of this population worldwide.104 
The root causes of many of the refugee flows out of present-day Ethiopia and 
Eritrea over the past half-century have been tied to conflicts resulting from domestic and 
regional struggles for independence in the postcolonial period. Indeed, Eritrea spent 30 
years in a tumultuous war to gain independence from Ethiopia. During the same period, 
Ethiopia underwent two major regime changes while ethnic groups sought self-
determination and representation within multiethnic Ethiopia. These struggles took place 
against a backdrop of periods of drought, famine, and economic instability that further 
compounded Eritreans’ and Ethiopians’ need to seek protection outside their borders.105 
Historically as well as today, Sudan has been a major receiving state for Ethiopian and 
Eritrean refugees. In 2000, of 66,410 Ethiopian refugees worldwide, 34,132 (or 51%) 
were in Sudan;106 in the same year the numbers for Eritreans were 376,851 and 367,735 
(or 98%), respectively.107  
Despite these realities, the Horn of Africa has received a lack of attention within 
academia and at policy-making levels.108 As of yet, no refugee regime has been created to 
fully address the enormous refugee situation in the region.109 While analyses of the 
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bilateral relations-refugee policy nexus have been conducted in other contexts, Horn of 
Africa states and the African continent more broadly have not been the subjects of in-
depth studies on this issue.110 International organizations have documented Sudan’s direct 
violation of non-refoulement, however, only a limited amount of scholarship has touched 
on why this occurs. 
 This chapter gives readers the historical context through which to understand 
modern events in the three countries of study. The impact of colonial and imperial rule on 
the formation of modern state borders and governments will be addressed, as will major 
factors that have produced refugee flows out of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Section 4.1 focuses 
on Ethiopia, section 4.2 on Eritrea, and section 4.3 on Sudan. Modern trends and 
developments in each country between 1991 and 2011 are introduced in this chapter; 
however Sudan’s foreign relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea will be given more attention 
in chapters 5 and 6. 
Between 1952-1991 Eritrea was under an UN-imposed federation with Ethiopia, 
with independence from Ethiopia officially being declared in 1993. Therefore when 
discussing the histories of Ethiopia and Eritrea prior to 1991, the liberation movements 
and people of present-day Eritrea (including refugee populations who fled from the 
region) will be considered Ethiopian for purposes of consistency and clarity. Many 
historians and scholars have done great justice in documenting the rich and complex 
history of this region and of the states of focus. However, for the purposes of this study 
only a brief overview of relevant historical events and factors that have shaped modern 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan will be provided.   
                                                




The modern history of Ethiopia began with the coronation of Emperor Tewodros 
II in 1855.111 Under the monarchy, which was interrupted by a short period of Italian 
occupation from 1936 – 1941, a number of small principalities were unified and the 
acquisition of southern territories brought a number of nations under the power primarily 
of the Amhara people of the North.112 An enduring legacy of Ethiopia’s Ancien Regime 
was its failure to build an ethnically-neutral state, as southern nations and ethnic groups 
were pressured to assimilate to the dominant Amhara language, culture, and religious 
practice.113 Coupled with uneven economic, health, and educational infrastructural 
development between rural and urban areas, and a mostly landless class of peasantry, 
much of Ethiopia’s population was disenfranchised throughout the imperial period.114 
Under Emperor Haile Selassie, the absolutist rule of the Ethiopian monarchy 
came to a climax. During the 1960s outcries of opposition arose in the forms of peasant 
rebellions, ethnic-based guerrilla groups, and broad-based university student 
movements.115 This culminated with a popular uprising and military coup in the 
Revolution of September 12, 1974.116 The Derg, or committee, which led the coup and 
assumed full power over the state, departed from and derailed the popular movements 
that were the catalyst behind the Revolution.117 The Derg Regime is now nearly 
synonymous with its leader, Mengistu Haile Marium. Though it fashioned itself as a 
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“Government of the People”, the Regime instituted “immature and dogmatic” socialist 
policies and was unable or unwilling to address the major problems that marred the state 
under its predecessors.118 Like the monarchy, the Derg was heavily Amhara-centric.119  
Perhaps one of its greatest missteps was the Derg’s failure to respond peacefully 
to ethnic and regional complaints.120 A number of ethnically and ideologically-based 
armed and political movements arose during the final years of the monarchy as well as 
under the Derg Regime. These included the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), 
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Party (EPRP). The Derg’s violent suppression of such groups marked one of the bloodiest 
periods in the history of the modern state, known grimly as the ‘Red Terror.’121 
By the late 1980s the central government and military had been greatly weakened 
by armed guerilla movements. In 1991, several of these movements joined forces to form 
the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which was clearly 
dominated by the Tigrayan TPLF. The EPRDF toppled the Derg Regime in 1991 and, 
seeking to replace the highly centralized system that had governed the country for so 
long, created a federal democracy consisting of ethnically based states.122  
4.1.1 Historic Trends in Ethiopian Refugee Flows 
Prior to the transition to EPRDF rule in 1991, Ethiopians had been living out a 
tragic history of displacement and asylum throughout the Horn of Africa region and 
worldwide for several decades. The now independent Eritrean peoples’ thirty-year 
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struggle for liberation from Ethiopia and the repressive responses of both Emperor Haile 
Selassie and the Derg Regime to their struggle, pushed thousands of Eritreans to seek 
asylum primarily in Sudan.123  After the rise of the Derg in 1974 other ethnic-based 
liberation movements within Ethiopia proper, including those of the Tigrayan, Oromo, 
and Somali peoples were increasingly suppressed, as was much other political opposition 
during Mengistu’s Red Terror campaign.124 In 1977 there were 200,000 Ethiopian 
refugees in Sudan and by 1978 this number doubled; the vast majority of these refugees 
came from present-day Eritrea.125  
Though Ethiopia experienced periods of major drought – most notably in 1973 
and 1984-1985 – which killed and internally displaced thousands, this alone did not have 
a significant impact on the numbers of Ethiopians crossing international borders to seek 
refuge.126 But that is not to say that environmental degradation has not impacted 
Ethiopian refugee flows. The Ethiopian Army’s burning of crops, food stuffs, and 
destruction of livestock as a military tactic as well as food scarcity due to conflict 
historically contributed to individuals’ decisions to flee the country.127 In 1984 there were 
500,000 Ethiopian refugees in Sudan and due to Ethiopian government-induced famine 
between October 1984 and March 1985, 300,000 more Ethiopians primarily of Tigray 
origin sought refuge in Sudan.128 Details about refugee flows from Ethiopia to Sudan 
after 1991 will be provided in chapter 5. 
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4.1.2 Ethiopia Today: Two Decades of Ethnic Federalism  
 Ethiopia’s experiment with ethnic federalism has now been carried out for just 
over twenty years, however this system has failed to solve Ethiopia’s endemic problem of 
a lack of representation for and suppression of many of its ethnic groups. The Tigrayan 
ethnic group as represented by the TPLF continues to dominate the EPRDF, just as the 
Amharas dominated the monarchy and Derg Regime.129  
 TPLF leader Meles Zenawi, who had ruled Ethiopia as President from 1991 -
1995 and Prime Minister from 1995 - 2012, passed away at the time of writing on August 
20, 2012. His two decades in power marked for Ethiopia a period of ongoing suppression 
of political opposition movements and parties, human rights abuses, and suppression of 
ethnic rights specifically amongst the Oromo people.130 It remains to be seen what 
changes, if any, the passing of Zenawi will bring to human rights practices in Ethiopia. 
4.2 Eritrea 
 The pre-colonial history of present day Eritrea is a subject that is highly 
contested due to polarized political views regarding the country’s historical and modern 
ties to Ethiopia.131 As it is not in the scope of this thesis to delve into this complex issue, I 
will frame this history beginning with Italy’s occupation of Massawa in present-day 
Eritrea in 1885. The territory – which was meant to serve as a stepping off point for 
                                                
129 Mengisteab, 184. 
130 See full report: HRW, “Suppressing Dissent”; HRW, World Report 2012, 121-125. 
131 For a thorough and nuanced discussion of this issue, see: Reid, “The Challenge of the 
Past,” 239-272. 
 38 
Italy’s primary ambition of colonizing Ethiopia – officially became a colony in 1890 and 
was named “Eritrea,” from the ancient Roman “Mare Erythraeum,” or Red Sea.132  
 The Italians devoted minimal resources to educating the native population, and 
the public education that was offered to Eritreans was taught in Italian and promoted the 
greatness of Italian history and leaders.133 Native Eritreans were not permitted to study 
beyond the fourth grade, schools were barred to girls, and were nonexistent in rural 
areas.134 As there was a surplus of Italian labor in the colony, Eritreans were kept out of 
even the lowest level bureaucratic posts, and no allowance was made to integrate pre-
colonial leaders or local political practices into the colonial system.135 Instead, the 
Eritrean population served primarily as a “reservoir of colonial soldiers” for the Italian 
military both within the colony and regionally.136 Out of a population of 500,000, 
approximately 40,000 Eritreans served in the Italian Army and youth were trained from 
an early age to be loyal to the military.137  In 1941, the British ousted the Italians from the 
region and gained control over Eritrea.138 Under a brief period of British rule the native 
population was allowed greater freedom of press and political organization, and though 
still far from adequate, the number of public schools was expanded.139  
 In the late 1940s the future of Eritrea was put in the hands of the United Nations 
General Assembly and in September 1952 Eritrea became “an autonomous unit federated 
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with Ethiopia.”140 Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia however, did not recognize 
Eritrea’s autonomy, claiming that this territory called “Eritrea” had always been a part of 
Ethiopia, and by 1962 the federation was replaced with the complete union of Eritrea 
with Ethiopia.141 Like many other nations including the Tigray and Oromo living under 
the Amhara-centric Ethiopian rule, Eritreans developed several liberation movements to 
struggle against the government beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s.142 Unlike 
other liberation movements in Ethiopia that sought greater representation or self-
determination within the country, the Eritrean movements were struggling unequivocally 
for independence and a state of their own.143 
 The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) guerrilla army arose in the early 1960s with 
the financial support of the Eritrean diaspora and some neighboring countries.144 In 1969 
and 1970 many members of the ELF broke into three groups, which in 1973 came to 
form the Eritrean People’s Liberation Forces – and later ‘Front’ (EPLF).145 The EPLF 
played a significant role in supporting the formation of the TPLF (which would come to 
dominate the ruling EPRDF) during the 1970s and in weakening the Derg Regime, thus 
paving the way for the EPRDF to rise to power in Ethiopia.146 The Eritrean War of 
Independence lasted thirty years from 1961-1991 and when it was time to build an 
independent nation, the EPLF was the only body prepared to take the lead.147  
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 As was previously noted, all Eritrean refugee movements that occurred prior to 
1991 have been covered in section 4.1.1 of this chapter. A thorough account of post-
independence refugee flows to Sudan is provided in chapter 6. 
4.2.1 Independent Eritrea 
Since Eritrea achieved de jure independence in 1993 the People’s Front for 
Democracy and Justice (PFDJ; formerly the EPLF) has been the only legal political party 
in the country.148 Elections have not taken place since 1993 and President Isaias Afewerki 
has led the country since de facto independence was achieved in 1991.149 Since at least 
2001, the Afewerki government has held tight reigns on the Eritrean people, kept 
independent media outlets closed, and heavily barred the movement of citizens within 
and out of the country.150 Today, Human Rights Watch describes Eritrea as having “one 
of the world’s most repressive governments.”151 Arbitrary detention of real and perceived 
opponents of the government, inhumane prison conditions, and forced labor and 
mistreatment of those serving in the mandatory “National Service” are among the reasons 
cited for this grim designation.152 
Since the late 1990s Eritrea has politically isolated itself both regionally and 
internationally. For a good portion of its time as an independent state, it has had tense 
relations or cut diplomatic ties entirely with regional neighbors Djibouti, Ethiopia, and 
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Sudan.153 Since the outbreak of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War in 1998, which was fought 
over contested border territory and claimed 70,000 lives on both sides, relations have 
been poor between the two governments.154 Eritrea withdrew its ambassador to the 
African Union (formerly the OAU) in 1998 and only reassigned him in 2011.155 In 
December 2009 the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea after their refusal 
to withdraw troops from Djibouti following 2008 clashes and for supporting armed 
groups opposed to the Somali Transitional Federal Government.156 
4.3 Sudan 
Sudan’s experience with two long periods of foreign rule in its recent history set 
the stage for a difficult post-independence formation of state identity and governance.157 
Sudan was already familiar with the realities of foreign rule when the Anglo-Egyptian 
colonial state was established in 1898. The territory that makes up modern Sudan was 
first brought under a centralized system during the Turco-Egyptian period of imperial 
rule (1820-1884), and left a legacy of intensifying the territory’s pre-existing slave trade 
and exploiting the people and resources of the region.158  
The period of Anglo-Egyptian ‘Condominium’ – a joint system of rule in which 
Britain controlled the central government, with junior positions being filled by Egyptians 
– can be summarized by the rule of alien origin, authoritarian governance, and the 
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consolidation of artificial boundaries.159 Although Sudan’s population has classically 
been depicted as a dichotomy between an Arab-Muslim north and African-Christian-
Animist south, scholars today generally reject this as a flawed and fictional over-
generalization.160 The creation of a northern, Arabic-speaking elite – the center of power 
in Sudan today – was fostered under the Condominium as the majority of economic, 
social, and educational services were focused on the north of the country, with other areas 
being neglected.161  
Colonial rule ended with independence on January 1, 1956 and Sudan embarked 
on a difficult road of self-rule. It has struggled with multiple civil wars rooted primarily 
in its longtime de facto separation into two countries – that is, North and South – for 
purposes of colonial administration.162 Sudan’s First Civil War began several months 
prior to independence and lasted until 1972.163 The Second Civil War raged from 1983 to 
2005. Fought primarily between the Sudanese military and the Southern Sudanese 
Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), it encompassed a number of splinter conflicts 
and in fact multiple wars took place during this period.164  
4.3.1 Sudan and Neighbors: Foreign Policy Concerns, 1956 - 1991   
This section explores Sudan’s relations with neighboring Ethiopia and Eritrean 
liberation forces between 1956 and 1991. On a global level and in the Cold War context, 
although Sudan proclaimed neutrality upon independence, its foreign policy was 
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primarily in line with Western politics and economics after 1956.165 Sudan’s leftist 
military coup of 1969 brought a shift in this alignment, and Sudan became oriented 
toward the Soviet Union and Arab states.166 By the 1980s, Sudan was again allied with 
the West and specifically the United States.167 Sudan’s fluctuating alignment with Cold 
War superpowers had a significant impact on its foreign policy and regional bilateral 
relations throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Sudan’s regional foreign policy and bilateral relations were manifested primarily 
in its approach to neighboring liberation and separatist movements. As Eritrean refugees 
began arriving in Sudan in the 1960s, the government supported the ELF and Kassala, 
Sudan came to house the movement’s Revolutionary Command.168 Correspondingly, 
during this period the Ethiopian government supported the Southern Sudanese separatist 
Anya Nya movement and allowed the group use of Ethiopian territory.169 In a sudden 
turnaround in policy, in July 1965 after Sudanese Prime Minister Mahjoub visited 
Ethiopia to resolve a disputed border issue, the two governments made an agreement that 
neither would support subversive activities against its neighbor within its territory.170 
Sudanese authorities began harassing politically active Eritrean refugees, and ELF forces 
based in Sudan were warned that further activities would result in closure of their offices 
and deportation to Ethiopia. Official records also show that the Sudanese government 
allowed Ethiopian Embassy officials in Khartoum to monitor Eritrean dissidents during 
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this period.171 Distrust between the two governments, however, soon gained an upper 
hand over these agreements and Sudan soon resumed its policy of support for Eritrean 
separatism.172  
Haile Selassie (under the prodding of Western backers) brokered a peace 
agreement between the Anya Nya and Sudanese government in Addis Ababa in 1972, 
with a clear expectation that Sudan would work to quell Eritrean subversive activities.173 
Cold War politics eventually took hold in the region, however. In the 1980s when Sudan 
aligned itself with the West, it began supporting Ethiopian and Eritrean separatists 
because they were now struggling against the Soviet-aligned Derg Regime.174 
Conversely, Ethiopia began supporting the SPLA/M in 1983.175  
Several points must be noted about the nature of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugee 
communities in Sudan’s during the period between the 1950s and 1991. When 
individuals cross a border seeking refuge, the host state might tolerate or even encourage 
these populations using their state as a base for subversive activities against their country 
of origin.176 Many of the refugee communities in Sudan during this period were treated 
akin to what Zolberg calls the “new Palestinians” and developed into “refugee-warrior 
communities”, which occurs when exile is prolonged and there exists a politically 
charged leadership (perhaps with an armed wing) actively pursuing regime change or 
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control over their home state.177 Sudan did not always tolerate these actions, however. 
Throughout the period discussed, Sudan’s policies toward Ethiopia were always in flux 
and included periods of attempted rapprochement with its neighbor.178 Sudan generally 
viewed Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees as “objects of policy” and was willing to protect 
its interests at any cost, even if – as was previously mentioned - that meant acting on 
behalf of the Ethiopian government in the implementation of policies toward Ethiopian 
asylum seekers.179 Sudan’s foreign policies toward the governments of Eritrea and 
Ethiopia from 1991 to the present day, as well as Sudan’s policies toward refugees from 
those two states are explored in-depth in chapters 4 and 5. 
4.3.2 The Sudan of Omar al-Bashir 
 Sudan’s military coup of June 30, 1989 ushered in a new era of Sudanese 
politics and brought to power the man who would rule Sudan beyond the two proceeding 
decades. Omar al-Bashir initially denied any link between his military coup and the 
Islamist political movement, the National Islamic Front (NIF), or its leader, Hassan al-
Turabi.180 A strong connection between the two quickly became apparent though, and 
while al-Turabi’s actions often strayed from al-Bashir’s official domestic and foreign 
policy, al-Turabi would play a major role in influencing events in modern Sudan.181 In 
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1998 the National Congress Party (NCP) was established as the “new face of the NIF” 
and has controlled the government since.182  
 Mantizkos argues that three primary issues were definitive of Sudan’s policies 
during the 1990s. These were: 1) support for international militant jihadists and 
Khartoum’s hosting of Islamist leaders; 2) cooperation between Sudan’s military and 
Islamist movements; and 3) a period of good relations with neighboring Eritrea and 
Ethiopia in the early part of the 1990s.183 Most aspects of civil society were crushed when 
al-Bashir came to power and a strong state security apparatus emerged, which has been 
responsible for major human rights abuses in Sudan over the past two decades.184 Already 
in place, an extremist interpretation of Sharia, Islamic law, was “relaunched” in 1992 and 
the Islamization of the political structure, education system, media, and societal 
framework was imposed on the north of the country.185 In the late 1990s Omar al-Bashir 
took steps to shift the ultra-Islamist image that Hassan al-Turabi had created for Sudan 
worldwide.186 The power struggle between the two men had grown throughout the 1990s 
and in 2000 al-Turabi was imprisoned.187 
 The new millennium brought a breakthrough in the North-South conflict. The 
Second Civil War ended when the NCP and SPLA/M signed the Comprehensive Peace 
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Agreement (CPA) in 2005.188 The CPA allowed for greater representation for the South 
and responded to some of their grievances, yet many ethnic and ideological groups were 
excluded from the Agreement proceedings.189 The CPA paved the way for the complete 
separation of South Sudan in July 2011, and though it made some provisions for the 
people of the northern regions of Abyei, South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, and Blue 
Nile, they generally did not benefit from it.190 There have been no truly “comprehensive” 
approaches taken to respond to the grievances of these people or those of eastern Sudan 
and Darfur, and to date the Sudanese military continues to clash with militias and commit 
human rights violations throughout these regions.191  
 Al-Bashir has become a pariah in the international community and his personal 
image has been greatly tarnished by the human rights abuses carried out by his 
government against the people of Sudan.192 In 2009 the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) accused al-Bashir of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
Darfur, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.193 The human rights climate remains very 
poor throughout Sudan today.194 
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 While Sudan will be studied in terms of its position as a refugee receiving state, 
it has also been a major refugee-generating state; in 1965 there were roughly 70,000 
Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries; by 1969 this number had risen to 172,800.195 
During the 1990s Sudan was a major African refugee sending country, and by 2003 with 
roughly 475,000 refugees, it became Africa’s primary source of refugees.196 As of 
January 2012 there were an estimated 500,014 Sudanese refugees worldwide, and another 
2,422,520 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the country.197 
 The events covered in this chapter offer only a glimpse into the complex 
histories and of these countries and people. This gives readers, however, a general 
context through which to understand the actors and events involved in the bilateral policy 
decisions that will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
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THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA 
In this chapter the Ethiopian case is presented and analyzed. In section 5.1 I 
present statistics on the numbers of Ethiopian refugees in Sudan between 1991 and 2011, 
as well as data on acts of refoulement that occurred during the same period. Section 5.2 
analyzes and discusses these cases of refoulement in the context of Sudan’s bilateral 
relations with Ethiopia during the period of study. Relevant findings based on two in-
depth interviews with Ethiopian refugees will also be included in this analysis. Girma and 
Daniel both were refugees in Sudan and now live in Cairo, Egypt. They provided 
firsthand accounts of Sudan’s policies toward Ethiopian refugees, and provided their 
opinions on refoulement and political relations between the two governments.198 
5.1 Refuge and Refoulement: Trends for Ethiopian Refugees in Sudan 
 Statistics for the number of Ethiopian refugees in Sudan for given years are based 
on UNHCR figures. It must be noted that the exactness of data on refugee numbers is 
always highly contested and, “the collection of accurate statistical data on refugees and 
asylum-seekers is one of the most problematic issues confronting UNHCR.”199 Collecting 
exhaustive data on the numbers of Ethiopians refouled by Sudan also proved difficult. 
The numbers presented in this study were compiled from data collected and recorded in 
reports, press releases, and articles published by agencies including UNHCR, U.S. 
Committee for Refugee and Immigrants, and Amnesty International. There is often 
secrecy surrounding deportations and in some cases the UNHCR has noted that it was 
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ignorant about an act of refoulement until after it occurred. It is likely that the numbers 
presented here are lower than the actual number of Ethiopians refouled between 1991 and 
2011.  
 Often refouled in groups, the deportees’ statuses as “recognized refugees,” 
“asylum-seekers,” or “not screened,” for example, were included in some reports. In 
other cases the status is not mentioned or it is noted that UNHCR did not have the 
opportunity to determine the status of the individuals prior to deportation. As all the 
reports presented in this study described Sudan’s actions as “refoulement” or a violation 
of international law, it is accepted that the following figures represent individual refugees 
or asylum-seekers, as opposed to other migrants. Though not explicitly stated in the 1951 
Convention, it is common practice to assume that all asylum-seekers are refugees until 
proven otherwise.200  
5.1.1 Facts and Figures: 1991 – 2000 
 The primary Ethiopian refugee populations in Sudan during the 1990s were those 
who had fled wars and human rights abuses that occurred under the Derg Regime (1974 
to 1991). Between 1993 and 1998, about 72,000 Ethiopian refugees who had fled the 
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former regime were repatriated from Sudan through a UNHCR-organized program.201 
The repatriation of Ethiopian refugees during this period was generally a smooth process, 
as a great number of returnees looked favorably upon their new home government.202 
From a financial standpoint, the cost to the Ethiopian government to reintegrate these 
individuals into their population of roughly sixty million posed no significant burden.203 
This must be kept in mind in chapter 6’s review of the attempted repatriation scheme for 
Eritrean refugees during the same period, which had a vastly different outcome. 
 In 1999 the UNHCR announced that it deemed the “ceased circumstances” clause 
of the 1951 Convention applicable to Ethiopian refugees who had fled their country prior 
to 1991.204 The organization found that “fundamental and durable change” had taken 
place in Ethiopia with the fall of Mengistu’s Derg Regime and that the persecution 
Ethiopian refugees had once feared no longer existed.205 The UNHCR allowed those who 
still feared persecution to request a review of their case and status.206 Despite this, 
thousands of Ethiopian refugees in Sudan felt they were being forced to repatriate and 
many held hunger strikes protesting what they felt was an unfair refugee status 
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determination system for case reviews.207 Table 1 shows the numbers of Ethiopian 
refugees in Sudan and the estimated number of individuals refouled between 1991 and 
2000. The steep decline in numbers between the early to mid-1990s is attributed to the 
large flow of returnees to Ethiopia during the period. Regarding instances of refoulement, 
“not available” (N/A) may denote that no cases of refoulement occurred in a specific year 
or that refoulement did occur, but was unreported. 
Table 1 
Ethiopian Refugees in Sudan and the Number of Individuals Refouled, 1991-2000 
 
Year Refugees Number of Individuals Refouled 
1991 N/A N/A 
1992 200,900 24 
1993 173,200 N/A 
1994 160,600 N/A 
1995 48,100 N/A 
1996 51,500 20 
1997 44,300 N/A 
1998 35,600 N/A 
1999 35,400 N/A 
2000 34,100 N/A 
Sources: UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2001, 92; sources for “Number of Individuals 
Refouled” are cited in section 5.1.1. 
 
 There were relatively few reports of refoulement in the 1990s. In June 1992 twenty-
four refugees who were members of the EPRP and included one university student, were 
handed across the border to Ethiopian authorities and immediately detained.208 
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Additionally, twenty refugees were returned to Ethiopia in 1996.209 They were victims of 
a round up that also targeted Eritrean refugees in the state of Kassala in June 1996.210 
These two incidents were the only publicized instances of refoulement in the 1990s, 
however both of the Ethiopian refugee interviewees consulted for this study describe that 
acts of refoulement were common prior to 1996. 
5.1.2 Facts and Figures: 2001-2011 
 At the beginning of the new millennium, Sudan continued to host many Ethiopian 
refugees who had fled their country prior to 1991. Among the primary causes of new 
Ethiopian refugee flows between 2001 and 2011, were real or imputed support for the 
OLF or Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), involvement in an opposition 
political party, or being of mixed Ethiopian and Eritrean origin. Established in the 1960s 
and a long time representative of Oromo nationalism, today the OLF is considered a 
terrorist organization by the EPRDF. 211 Simply being an ethnic Oromo with no links to 
the OLF can be cause for arbitrary detention, torture, and other forms of persecution due 
to imputed membership with the organization.212 Extreme government brutality toward 
Oromos, university students, and those involved with political opposition movements 
preceded and followed the May 2005 elections, causing many to seek refuge abroad.213  
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 The “cessation clause” for pre-1991 Ethiopian refugees was practically 
implemented in March 2000, although because of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War only 
around 1,000 Ethiopians repatriated during the year.214 They were followed by another 
10,000 in 2001.215 Because many Ethiopians did not wish to return, but were 
unsuccessful in having their refugee status renewed, it was estimated that by the end of 
2001 approximately 10,000 pre-1991 Ethiopians lived in “refugee-like situations” in 
Sudan.216 Table 2 presents Ethiopian refugee figures in Sudan as well as the estimated 
number of individuals refouled between 2001 and 2011. 
Table 2  
 
Ethiopian Refugees in Sudan and the Number of Individuals Refouled, 2001-2011 
 
Year Refugees Number of Individuals Refouled 
2001 16,120 N/A 
2002 14,571 N/A 
2003 15,251 N/A 
2004 14,812 N/A 
2005 14,633 N/A 
2006 11,009 4 
2007 11,416 <64 
2008 8,621 129 
2009 9,170 N/A 
2010 9,100 N/A 
2011 4,400 1 
Sources: UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2005, 503; UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2006, 
“Table 5”; UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2007, 77; UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2008, 
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84; UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2009, 76; UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2010, 79; 
UNHCR, Global Report 2011, 62; sources for “Number of Individuals Refouled” are 
cited in section 5.1.2. 
 
No cases of refoulement were reported between 2000 and 2005. Sudan, however, 
often did not provide the UNHCR with information about detained refugees or 
deportations, and so some acts may have occurred in secrecy.217 In 2005, when the 
UNHCR became aware of attempted acts of refoulement, the organization intervened 
successfully on behalf of the refugees.218 This indicates that though they were 
unsuccessful, the Sudanese government did attempt to carry out forced returns of 
refugees during the year. On May 11, 2006 the Sudanese National Intelligence and 
Security Services deported four asylum seekers who were members of the Ethiopian 
opposition party, Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), before they could be 
interviewed by the UNHCR.219  
 The year 2007 was rife with acts of refoulement against Ethiopian refugees in 
Sudan. There appear to have been at least five separate acts of refoulement in the year, to 
which an unknown number of refugees and asylum-seekers fell victim. In January, two 
youth whose refugee parents lived in Khartoum were deported from Gedaref.220 In 
February an “unknown number” of asylum seekers were arrested and deported, along 
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with another thirty-six recognized refugees in August.221 Despite condemnation from the 
UNHCR, on September 27 another fifteen refugees who included alleged members of the 
OLF as well as 74-year-old Atanaw Wasie, a longtime political activist in need of 
medical attention at the time, were deported.222 Eleven Ethiopians “allied to the Ethiopian 
opposition movement” were deported in October, and it is presumed that other acts of 
refoulement were committed in 2007 beyond these reported.223 
 In 2008 another 129 Ethiopians were refouled from Sudan. Eighteen of these 
were recognized refugees, fifty-three were asylum seekers who had not yet been screened 
by the UNHCR, and the status of the others was not confirmed.224 In November 2011 the 
SOCEPP condemned Sudan’s recent arrest and deportation of an Ethiopian dissident 
named Andualem Alemayehu.225 Though the report does not mention his status as a 
refugee, it notes that he “face[d] grave danger to his life in the hands of the EPRDF 
regime he had condemned publicly.”226 
5.2 Sudanese-Ethiopian Relations and Refoulement of Ethiopians 
 
 While past Sudanese regimes had shifted policies and treatment toward 
Ethiopian refugees throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, interviewee Daniel 
noted that 1991 ushered in an era of deportations that he had not witnessed since he 
arrived in exile in Sudan in 1983. In this analysis it is found that there has generally been 
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a direct correlation between changes in the Sudanese government’s policies toward and 
relations with Ethiopia, and its refoulement (and other differential treatment) of Ethiopian 
refugees. This is especially clear when this issue is viewed in the context of refugees 
politically opposed to the Ethiopian government. 
Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia have not always been clearly “good” or 
“bad” and as is the case with all states, the motives behind Sudan’s policy decisions are 
not always obvious and may be influenced by a wide variety of factors. As Girma opined 
during his interview, there has long been an underlying tension between the two 
countries, yet they coexist because they must. Even when the official relationship is one 
of friendship, he said, under the surface the two are “bleeding” and Sudan will always put 
its own interests at the forefront of this relationship or its other obligations. “What I know 
is that always the friendship is superficial. Yet, they do function!” Similarly, Verhoven 
has referred to the relationship between the two governments as one of “mutual 
suspicion.”227 In order to gain a fuller picture of Sudanese sentiments toward Ethiopian 
refugees, this analysis includes some discussion of treatment of refugees in terms of 
arrests, permittance of political activity, and other factors in addition to our primary focus 
upon refoulement. 
5.2.1 1991: A New Ethiopia and Refugees of the Past Regime 
 Khartoum played a significant role in supporting the Ethiopian liberation 
struggles that eventually toppled the Derg Regime in 1991. In the early days of Ethiopia’s 
regime change, the new government understood that it was indebted to Sudan for the 
support it had given and understood that if it wished, Sudan could ‘destabilize” EPRDF 
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rule – especially through the threat of Islamization.228 Indeed, by 1992 Hassan al-Turabi’s 
NIF began helping to establish and support Islamic organizations amongst Ethiopian 
communities – especially the Oromo – who were unhappy with EPRDF rule.229 Some of 
these organizations called for jihad against Ethiopia and in this way the Sudanese 
government indirectly threatened Ethiopia with its “Islamizing foreign policy.”230 
Officially however, relations between the two governments were “cordial,” if not quite 
good in the early 1990s and “despite being ideologically miles apart, the personal 
relationship between [al-Turabi] and [Zenawi] underpinned a degree of stability not seen 
for decades between the two countries.”231 
The group of Ethiopian refugees refouled by Sudan in 1992 consisted of political 
opponents affiliated with the EPRP. Like the TPLF (the movement that would come to 
lead the EPRDF), the EPRP was strongly opposed to the Derg Regime. However, 
political competition and differing motives between the two groups had caused tension 
between them since the 1970s.232 The two groups’ relations were “conflictual” in 1992 
and throughout the 1990s the EPRP was not legally permitted to organize within 
Ethiopia, as it did not consider the EPRDF a “legitimate authority.”233 Interviewee Daniel 
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recalled that in the late 1980s the Sudanese government had favored the TPLF over the 
EPRP, as the latter group did not pose as strong an armed threat to the Derg Regime.  
Daniel also shared the story of a friend and EPRP colleague named Mashisha who 
was among the group refouled in 1992. When Mashisha fled from Ethiopia to Sudan a 
second time in 1996 and was reunited with Daniel, he recounted his story. In 1992 
Mashisha had been picked up from his home, handed across the border to Ethiopian 
authorities along with other refugees, and immediately imprisoned in northern Ethiopia. 
He was not treated badly in prison because he was old and had an injured leg, but from 
his cell he could hear the screams of the other deportees as they were tortured. Although 
he was not physically tortured, he was interrogated about EPRP activities and members.  
Another victim of this 1992 act of refoulement was Tadelle Demeke, an Ethiopian 
refugee living in exile in the United Kingdom.234 She had been on an academic visit to 
Sudan when she was arrested and forcibly returned to Ethiopia.235As Sudan’s official 
policies toward the EPRDF were quite supportive in 1992, and considering that the 
Sudanese government had shown favor to the TPLF prior to the fall of the Derg, this act 
of refoulement had a clear political motivation and represents a goodwill gesture on the 
part of Sudan toward its new neighboring regime.  
Sudan’s policies toward Ethiopia continued to “focus on improving cooperation,” 
and a symbol of this was the signing of a tripartite agreement (with the UNHCR) that 
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allowed for the repatriation of Ethiopian refugees from Sudan that began in 1993.236 July 
1995 brought a souring to these relations, however, when former Egyptian president, 
Hosni Mubarak, was the victim of a failed assassination attempt in Addis Ababa.237 
Ethiopia immediately accused Sudan of harboring those who were responsible for the 
attack and announced that it would suspend some diplomatic operations in Sudan.238 Both 
countries volleyed complaints and accusations that its neighbor was taking part in cross-
border aggressions and raids.239 The UNHCR notes that the ensuing “political 
sensitivities” posed a threat to the tripartite repatriation program at certain points until it 
ended in 1998.240 
 The June 1996 incident of refoulement took place in the context of this shift in 
relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Those returned to Ethiopia were victims of a 
random round up that also targeted Eritrean refugees. Unlike in the case of 1992, they 
were not individually targeted political opponents of the EPRDF. In late 1995 the 
Ethiopian government voiced concern that the lives of Ethiopian refugees in Sudan were 
“under serious threat.”241 It must be noted that most Ethiopian refugees in Sudan at this 
time were not opponents of the new regime and would not have been under threat of 
persecution from the EPRDF. Therefore, this act can be understood as a way for Sudan to 
flex its power and use Ethiopian refugees to send a message of hostility to Ethiopia. 
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 This fact becomes clearer if we consider the immediate shift in Sudan’s treatment 
of refugees who were political opponents during the same period. During our interview 
Daniel noted that EPRP offices that had been forcibly shut down in 1992 were alerted by 
the Sudanese authorities that they were welcome to reopen their offices in 1995. He also 
noted that treatment of Ethiopian refugees in general became better around this time. This 
is substantiated in a report that noted that in 1996, despite the round up and deportation 
that occurred in Kassala, “government harassment of [Ethiopian] refugees abated, and 
most of those in detention were released.”242  
 Interviewee Girma claimed that prior to 1996, “EPRP members were literally 
hunted in Khartoum.” He recalled that during this period Ethiopian security forces were 
permitted to drive into Sudanese territory and with the assistance of Sudanese 
government intelligence, were able to pinpoint specific refugees and forcibly take them 
back to Ethiopian territory: 
In most cases the Sudanese government knows who is who – I mean those 
who are engaged politically [among the Ethiopian refugee population]. 
And Khartoum will simply allow the Ethiopian government to do what 
they want. 
 
He goes on to describe how he personally knew members of the EPRP in Sudan who had 
to go into hiding and move to a new location each day in order to avoid being captured by 
Ethiopian security in Sudan. An EPRP Chairman named Abebe lived this way until he 
was resettled to a third country. He posited that acts such as these were Sudan’s way of 
using Ethiopian refugees as pawns in a larger political game in which it avoided direct, 
open confrontation with Ethiopia: 
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Girma: “…[Sudan and Ethiopia] have rarely confronted each other.” 
Interviewer: “Directly?” 
Girma: “Most likely never, never! There has never been an open 
confrontation between the two, but they often use a proxy. That’s why it 
became dangerous for the refugee – because of the culture of the two 
countries’ confrontation.” 
 
5.2.2 A “New Era” and the “Worst Period” for Refugees 
 With the outbreak of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War in 1998, Ethiopia and Sudan 
entered a period of rapprochement and “peaceful cooperation,” while Eritrea became a 
common enemy.243 The Government of Sudan ended support for Eritrean opposition 
groups based in its country and Ethiopia scaled back support for the SPLA.244 Daniel 
described that in 1998 the situation became much worse for Ethiopian refugees in Sudan 
and there were many cases of refugees being detained and tortured by the Sudanese 
authorities; others were kidnapped and sent back to Ethiopia. Despite his claims, no 
reports of refoulement in the late 1990s were found.  
With the advent of the new millennium the shared Ethiopian-Sudanese border was 
reopened, Ethiopia was granted access to Port Sudan for imports and exports, and the 
countries reached a number of agreements regarding cross border railways and roads.245 
In 2002 after a four-day visit to Ethiopia, Sudan’s Vice President Taha announced, “the 
main message of my visit to Addis Ababa this time is to make very clear with my 
brothers in the leadership of Ethiopia that our relations have entered a new era… This 
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new era between the two countries is full of positive accomplishments and is well 
defined.”246  
There were few reports of refoulement in the first several years of the twenty-first 
century, however an immeasurable number of Ethiopians who were repatriated due to the 
enactment of the “cessation clause” may have still had legitimate refugee claims and 
therefore been victims of refoulement. There were claims that this program was part of a 
forced repatriation scheme agreed to between the governments of Ethiopia and Sudan and 
the UNHCR.247 Refugee complainants claimed that some Ethiopians protesting the 
removal of their refugee status were arrested and deported, or had been threatened 
accordingly.248 Daniel described that many Ethiopian refugees who had been stripped of 
their refugee status in Sudan were pushed into a desperate situation; fearing return to 
Ethiopia, they sought alternative countries of refuge. He said this was the beginning of 
the “worst period” for Ethiopian refugees in Sudan, describing: 
People started going to Libya and so many died trying to cross the big 
desert and are buried in the sands…And many of them, after getting 
outside Sudan, got money from family abroad and drowned in the sea 
trying to cross to Italy. Many came to Egypt and try to cross to Israel with 
smugglers, and others to Kenya. And some people just give up on 
everything and go back to Ethiopia, where they are detained again. I think 
it is worse even now. Somalia has no government, but people are so 
desperate, they’ll cross through Somalia to Yemen. So many lose their 
lives trying to go to South Africa too. I am here [in Cairo, Egypt].  
 
In this context, it would be quite impossible to ascertain how many Ethiopian refugees 
who were “voluntarily repatriated” after 2000, were in fact victims of refoulement. 
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Furthermore, many others may have been pushed to seek refuge in a third country outside 
of Sudan as a result of the enactment of the “cessation clause.” 
 Following the 2005 signing of the CPA, Ethiopia generally removed itself from 
Sudanese affairs (vis-à-vis its longtime, sporadic support for the SPLA/M) and has been 
cooperative with Khartoum.249 In 2006 the two governments signed an agreement with 
the UNHCR to peacefully facilitate the repatriation of Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia.250 
The first report of a successful deportation of refugees during this “new era” was of the 
four CUD members refouled in May 2006. Leading up to and following the 2005 
elections in Ethiopia, arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings of CUD members 
were widely reported in Ethiopia.251 This case of refoulement took place against the 
backdrop of a year of home raids, beatings, and the use of tear gas by the Sudanese 
authorities on Ethiopian asylees.252 That these four refugees all belonged to an opposition 
party facing heavy persecution in Ethiopia at the time indicates that by carrying out this 
act, Sudan was exercising a clear policy of cooperation with the Ethiopian government. 
 In the first half of 2007 the two governments held a number of bilateral sessions and 
meetings. After a visit to Ethiopia in March 2007 the speaker of Sudan’s National 
Assembly voiced his appreciation to Ethiopia for the role they were playing in 
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negotiating for peace between the NCP and the SPLA/M.253 During this visit 
representatives from the two countries also signed a “memorandum of understanding.”254 
Amnesty International linked differential treatment of Ethiopian refugees in 2007 to 
improved relations between Sudan and Ethiopia, noting, “the recent detentions of 
Ethiopians came immediately after the Ethiopian foreign minister visited Sudan in June 
2007.”255  
 Specific details about the victims were unknown or not noted in most reports on the 
2007 cases of refoulement that likely targeted upwards of 100 Ethiopian refugees. 
However, in at least several cases, the refugees refouled were said to be political 
opponents. The SOCEPP reported in August 2009 that political activist Wasie and 
fourteen of the other refugees deported with him in 2007 were held in secret detention 
centers in Ethiopia for fifteen months where they were interrogated and mistreated before 
being transferred to Kaliti Prison.256 Wasie died while in Ethiopian government custody 
later that month.257 These 2007 instances of refoulement as well as those in 2008 to 
which 129 Ethiopians fell victim, can be attributed primarily to Sudan’s ever-increasing 
political support of and cooperation with Ethiopia. Considering that 2007 was also a 
major year of round ups and refoulement of Eritrean refugees, however, other factors 
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likely influenced Sudan’s decision to carry out these acts. The burden that refugees place 
upon Sudan due to a lack of support and dedication from the international community, 
and its role in Sudan’s policy-making decisions, will be discussed thoroughly in section 
6.5 of chapter 6. 
5.2.3 The Future: “The Importance of Coordination”  
 2011 was a year of major transition for Sudan as the country was split into two 
nations – Sudan and South Sudan – on July 9, 2011. Ethiopia facilitated this transition by 
deploying troops to play a peacekeeping role in Sudan’s Abyei area.258 Speaking 
posthumously of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, a Sudanese foreign ministry spokesman 
praised the leader for his supportive role in negotiating for peace between Khartoum and 
South Sudan throughout 2011.259 In October 2011 Sudanese President al-Bashir “stressed 
the importance of coordination” and “reaffirmed his country’s readiness to cooperate 
with Ethiopia on all issues.”260 This rhetoric of cooperation followed a meeting in which 
a tripartite committee (with Egypt) was formed to review an Ethiopian dam project. 
Sudan has long depended on Blue Nile water, which flows across the border from its 
source in Ethiopia, for irrigation and energy developing dam projects.261 Though by no 
means a new source of contention or policy decision making for Sudan, access to and use 
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of this water has increasingly come to the forefront of discussions between the states.262  
One month after al-Bashir voiced his dedication to cooperation, the Sudanese 
deportation of Ethiopian opposition figure Andualem Alemayehu occurred. UNHCR 
reports that in 2011 a total of seventy-seven Eritrean and Ethiopian were refouled from 
Eastern Sudan and through advocacy, the organization managed to halt a number of other 
planned deportations.263 No details regarding specific Ethiopian cases of refoulement 
were found. 
In December 2011 the two governments reached a security agreement that they 
would not host or receive rebels engaged in activities against their neighbor (that is, 
Sudan would not host Ethiopian rebels and vice versa).264 Though it is beyond the 
temporal parameters of this study, it must be noted that this agreement paved the way to a 
bilateral extradition agreement signed in May 2012.265 The Forum for Democratic 
Dialogue in Ethiopia, a coalition of Ethiopian opposition groups, has condemned this 
agreement and is confident it will be used as a guise under which to target and deport 
political refugees.266 It remains to be seen how the extradition agreement will be used.  
5.3 Conclusion 
This analysis has found that Sudan allows its relations with the Ethiopian 
government to influence its policies toward Ethiopian asylum-seekers and refugees. 
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Sudan has clearly violated the principle of non-refoulement on a number of occasions 
throughout 1991 and 2011, and has often done so for a specific political purpose. 
Generally these acts have occurred during periods of cooperative and strong relations 
between the Sudanese and Ethiopian governments, and many victims of refoulement have 
been specifically targeted political opponents of the EPRDF.  
An exception to this was the 1996 refoulement of refugees who had been 
randomly rounded up during a time of poor relations between the governments. It is 
assumed that these individuals were not wanted by the Ethiopian authorities and were 
used as tools of policy by Sudan to display its disapproval of the Ethiopian government. 
Though overall Sudan’s forcible return of Ethiopians is linked to its relations with the 
Ethiopian government, in some cases these acts may also be understood as reflections of 
Sudan’s inability or unwillingness to cope with its large refugee populations.  
There were a number of years in this study when relations were positive between 
Sudan and Ethiopia, yet there were no reports of refugees being refouled. One can only 
speculate about why this is the case. A reason may be that acts of refoulement did in fact 
occur during those years, but went undetected or unreported by UNHCR. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CASE OF ERITREA 
 This chapter takes the case of Eritrea to analyze the bilateral relations-refugee 
policy nexus in Sudan. As in the case of Ethiopia, the primary measure used in this study 
is Sudan’s practice of refoulement, however there will be some discussion of other forms 
of treatment of Eritrean refugees when appropriate. Section 6.1 presents qualitative and 
quantitative data about Eritrean refugees in Sudan, as well as Sudan’s refoulement of 
Eritreans, between 1991 and 2011. Section 6.2 gives an overview of Sudanese-Eritrean 
relations and Sudan’s policies toward its neighbor throughout the period of study. Acts of 
refoulement are analyzed in the context of these policies. Section 6.3 discusses these 
factors in light of the international refugee regime and notes those shortcomings of the 
regime manifested in the Eritrean case. 
6.1 Refuge and Refoulement: Trends for Eritrean Refugees in Sudan  
 Problems noted in chapter 5 regarding the collection of accurate data on refugee 
numbers, and providing an exhaustive account of acts of refoulement apply to the 
Eritrean case as well. Numbers presented in this chapter for Eritrean refugees in Sudan 
between 1991 and 2011 are based on UNHCR figures. Speaking on the subject of 
Ethiopian (including Eritrean) refugee numbers in the decades preceding the 1990s 
Kibreab noted that, “figures are based on guesses rather than census and should be 
considered with great precaution.”267 The UNHCR has also acknowledged this 
contestation, noting that the subject has been the source of “much controversy.”268 
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Qualitative and quantitative data about Eritrean deportees refouled by Sudan have been 
compiled primarily from reports published by the UNHCR, USCRI, Amnesty 
International, and Human Rights Watch. 
6.1.1 Facts and Figures: 1991 – 2000 
 Eritrean refugees in Sudan throughout the 1990s were primarily those who had fled 
for reasons related to the Eritrean peoples’ thirty-year struggle for independence from 
Ethiopia. For nearly ten years following independence there were no “new” Eritrean 
refugees arriving in Sudan.269 In 1994 the UNHCR reached two bilateral agreements – 
one with the Government of Eritrea and the other with the Government of Sudan – to 
facilitate the return of Eritrean refugees.270 Hampered by insufficient funds from 
international donors and deteriorating relations between the Sudanese and Eritrean 
governments, the repatriation scheme was largely unsuccessful.271 Between 1991 and the 
start of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War in 1998, it was estimated that only 130,000 Eritrean 
refugees had voluntarily repatriated; the majority of these did so without international 
assistance.272 
 Independent Eritrea’s first major refugee-creating crisis occurred during the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian War. In May 2000, when Ethiopian forces gained major control in 
Eritrea and nearly 100,000 Eritreans fled to Sudan within a two-week period, though 
most voluntarily returned to Eritrea when the violence subsided.273 Table 3 notes the 
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number of Eritrean refugees in Sudan and the estimated number of individuals refouled 
between 1991 and 2000. 
Table 3 
 
Eritrean Refugees in Sudan and the Number of Individuals Refouled, 1991-2000 
 
Year Refugees Estimated Number of Individuals 
Refouled 
1991 N/A N/A 
1992 502,600 N/A 
1993 424,500 N/A 
1994 419,300 N/A 
1995 282,800 N/A 
1996 328,300 224 
1997 315,000 N/A 
1998 342,300 N/A 
1999 342,100 N/A 
2000 367,700 N/A 
Sources: UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2001, 92; source for “Number of Individuals 
Refouled” are cited in section 6.1.1. 
 
 During the 1990s there was one officially reported refoulement incident. This act 
was mentioned in chapter 5 as well because it targeted both Eritrean and Ethiopian 
refugees and asylum-seekers during a roundup in Kassala. A total of 224 Eritreans were 
taken in trucks to the border and forced to cross back into Eritrea on foot.274 
6.1.2 Facts and Figures: 2001-2011  
 In 2001, the majority of Eritrean refugees in Sudan had lived in exile in the 
country for over thirty years.275 Roughly half of this population lived in camps and 
settlements in Eastern Sudan, while the other half had settled in towns like Kassala, 
Gedaref, and the capital city of Khartoum.276 In February 2002 UNHCR announced that 
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on December 31, 2002 the “ceased circumstances” cessation clause would be applied to 
Eritrean refugees who fled their country as a result of the War for Independence, as well 
as those who fled because of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War.277 By late 2003 only 9,000 
refugees – a quarter of those who had registered for repatriation – were able to return 
because of a souring in Sudanese-Eritrean relations and resulting border closure.278 In 
2004, UNHCR noted “the political developments in Eritrea have resulted in a relatively 
small number of refugees willing to repatriate, and an upsurge of new arrivals with a very 
high RSD (refugee status determination) recognition rate.”279 Despite this, between 2000 
and 2007, an estimated 120,000 refugees repatriated with assistance and another 110,000 
did so without assistance.280 Human rights abuses and indefinite, forced military service 
have been the primary causes of Eritrean flights in the twenty-first century.281 Other 
sources of persecution cited by asylees include religious and political beliefs.282 
 Table 4 shows the numbers of Eritrean refugees in Sudan and the estimated 
number of individuals refouled between 2001 and 2011. The decline in numbers during 
this period is only due in part to repatriation programs and cannot be attributed to a 
decreased flow of Eritrean asylees to Sudan. On the contrary, in 2007 approximately 100 
                                                
277 UNHCR, “Applicability of the "Ceased Circumstances" Cessation Clauses to Eritrean 
Refugees Who Fled Their Country as a Result of the War of Independence Which Ended 
in June 1991 or as a Result of the Border Conflict Between Ethiopia and Eritrea Which 
Ended in June 2000,” policy note, Refworld, February 18, 2002, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4165729f4.html. 
278 USCRI, “World Refugee Survey 2004 - Sudan,” Refworld, May 25, 2004, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/40b459480.html. 
279 UNHCR, Global Report 2004, 188. 
280 Bariagaber, Conflict and the Refugee Experience, 145. 
281 AI, Amnesty International Annual Report 2012, 142-144. 
282 USCRI, “World Refugee Survey 2004 – Sudan.” 
 73 
Eritreans arrived in Sudan each week.283 Between 2009 and 2012, that number rose to 
2,000 to 3,000 new arrivals in Sudan each month.284 The number of individuals resettled 
to a third country from Sudan’s total refugee population has often been negligible.285 
 Many Eritreans employ the assistance of smugglers to leave Sudan with hopes of 
reaching Israel or Europe, but have increasingly become the targets of transnational 
human trafficking networks.286 In 2009 Human Rights Watch noted that estimates for the 
number of Eritrean refugees in Sudan were likely low due to the numbers who transit 
directly to other countries or are trafficked before applying for refugee status.287  
Table 4 
Eritrean Refugees in Sudan and the Number of Individuals Refouled, 2001-2011 
 
Year Refugees Number of Individuals Refouled 
2001 324,546 N/A 
2002 305,294 N/A 
2003 108,251 N/A 
2004 110,927 4 
2005 116,746 N/A 
2006 157,220 N/A 
2007 160,488 <540 
2008 124,785 N/A 
2009 113,528 N/A 
2010 103,800 N/A 
2011 100,500 <340 
Sources: UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2005, 503; UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2006, 
“Table 5”; UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2007, 77; UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2008, 
84; UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2009, 76; UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2010, 79; 
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UNHCR, Global Report 2011, 62; sources for “Number of Individuals Refouled” are 
cited in section 6.1.2. 
 
 In 2004 Sudan refouled four Eritrean refugees who had fled compulsory 
National Service.288 In August of the same year, seventy-five Eritrean refugees in the 
process of being refouled by Libya overtook the aircraft bound for Eritrea and forced it to 
land in Sudan.289 Though some of those aboard the flight were granted refugee status in 
Sudan, fifteen were convicted under the country’s Anti-Terrorism Act and charged with 
five years in prison to be followed by deportation.290  
 In 2007 reports indicate that Sudan refouled approximately 540 Eritreans in at 
least four separate acts. In May, six asylum-seekers were deported from Kassala and in 
June two families of asylum-seekers were also forcibly returned.291 In July, 500 Eritrean 
refugees were arrested and prepared for deportation the following week, however it is 
unclear how many of these individuals were in fact returned.292 Additionally, a group of 
twenty-five that included Eritreans and Ethiopians were deported before UNHCR had the 
opportunity to determine their statuses.293   
 2011 brought a peak in refoulement cases for Eritreans in Sudan. In early May a 
group was arrested upon arrival in the country and when charged with illegal entry, they 
requested to be imprisoned rather than be returned to Eritrea.294 Between May 26 and 
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June 2, eight members of this group were deported.295 Those remaining as well as another 
group of seventeen faced imminent deportation in June of 2011.296 It is presumable that 
none of these individuals were given the opportunity to request asylum or have their 
cases heard. On July 25, four asylum-seekers were forcibly returned.297 Two others being 
deported with this group jumped off the truck transporting them to the Eritrean border; 
one aged seventeen was hospitalized and the other, who was twenty-three years old, died 
from injuries.298 Like the earlier cases in the year, the July 25 group had been charged 
with illegal entry into Sudan and it was confirmed that they were not given access to 
asylum procedures.299 The UNHCR openly condemned this act and noted that a total of 
thirty asylum-seekers and refugees had been refouled between May and July of 2011.300 
 On September 15, 2011, four Eritreans whose request for asylum had been 
ignored were deported, as were another six on September 18.301 On October 17, Sudan 
refouled over 300 Eritrean asylum-seekers and refugees.302 The deportees came from a 
group of between 317 and 351 Eritreans, which included women and children, who had 
been arrested in September while trying to cross the border from Sudan to Egypt.303 
UNHCR and Sudan’s COR had agreed that the group would be moved to Khartoum for 
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asylum screening purposes, however this agreement was not honored and UNHCR was 
not aware of the forced return until the deportees were already in Eritrea.304 After being 
handed across the border to the Eritrean military, the group was taken directly to a 
military base.305 
6.2 Sudanese-Eritrean Relations and Refoulement of Eritreans 
 Before Sudan’s policies toward Eritrean refugees vis-à-vis its relations with their 
home government can be discussed, attention must be paid to the Eritrean government’s 
own attitude toward Eritrean refugees between 1991 and 2011. 
As will be elaborated upon in sub-section 6.2.1, UNHCR and Khartoum saw the 
Eritrean government as being uncooperative in facilitating the repatriation of its refugee 
population from Sudan in the 1990s. One reason was because Eritrea expected further 
international funding to reintegrate returnees into its society. The other was due to its 
impractical insistence that all potential returnees be screened to ensure that they did not 
have anti-EPLF/PFDJ sentiments. Despite this apparent lack of enthusiasm toward the 
reception of returnees, the account of one woman who was repatriated in 1997 
demonstrates that returnees were treated well upon arrival. The woman describes that the 
Eritrean government welcomed her and gave her and her child food aid (though she was 
later persecuted when it was discovered that she was of mixed Eritrean and Ethiopian 
origin).306 This indicates that the Government of Eritrea did not mistreat returned 
refugees for their previous decision to seek refuge. Eritrean refugees in Sudan at this time 
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were not representations of the failures of independent Eritrea, but of the Haile Selassie 
and Derg regimes of Ethiopia. 
This is a great contrast to the Eritrean government’s attitude toward Eritrean 
refugees who fled the country after independence in 1991. Since at least the early 2000s, 
the Eritrea has considered failed asylum-seekers as government opponents.307 Failed 
asylum-seekers have been interrogated about their motives in seeking asylum and about 
what they said about the Eritrean government while abroad.308 As a 2002 returnee 
interviewed by Amnesty International described, “we were asked why we had left Eritrea, 
why we had spoken against the government, and we were beaten with leather and rubber 
whips if we denied their accusations.”309 Nearly every Eritrean refouled since at least 
2008 has been put in incommunicado detention upon arrival in Eritrea.310 There are also 
reports that under duress of torture or threats thereof, these men and women are made to 
admit that their claims of persecution at the hands of the Eritrean government were false 
and that they have committed an act of treason.311 The Eritrean government’s clear shift 
in attitude toward those who have sought asylum is important to consider throughout this 
analysis. 
6.2.1 Relations and Refoulement: 1991 - 2000  
When the EPLF claimed victory in the War for Independence in 1991, Sudan 
ended support for all other Eritrean dissident groups that remained on Sudanese soil.312 
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Following independence in 1993, the first foreign visit made by new President Isaias 
Afwerki was to Sudan.313 A source of tension that quickly arose between independent 
Eritrea and Sudan, however, was secular Eritrea’s distrust of the NIF’s staunch support 
for Islamist movements regionally and worldwide. This tension materialized when 
Asmara voiced support for the National Democratic Alliance and Sudan for the Eritrean 
Jihad Movement (EJM), a small Islamist insurgent group.314 In December 1993 Eritrea 
and Sudan had their first open conflict. After intercepting Sudan-based EJM forces in 
Eritrean border territory, Asmara cut all diplomatic ties with the Government of Sudan 
and allowed the NDA to take over the Sudanese embassy in Asmara.315 
The June 1996 act of refoulement (that targeted both Eritreans and Ethiopians) 
must be understood in the context of the 1994 Eritrean refugee repatriation scheme. This 
project failed primarily because of the recent deterioration in Eritrean-Sudanese relations 
as well as a shortage in funds from the international community. By October 1995 Sudan 
renounced its agreement to assist in the repatriation of Eritrean refugees, and insisted on 
the establishment of a tripartite agreement to secure more funds.316 These demands were 
made in order to “get a compensation for hosting Eritrean refugees for decades.”317 In 
addition to the previously mentioned political tensions between the Sudanese and 
Eritrean governments, Asmara was also highly uncooperative and selective of who could 
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return during the repatriation process.318 The Eritrean government insisted that all 
potential returnees be screened, a primary reason for this being its unwillingness to accept 
refugees with anti-EPLF or pro-Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council (ELF-
RC) sentiments.319 Another reason for Eritrea’s uncooperative approach to the 
repatriation program is that it saw UNHCR’s proposed allocation of funds for the 
reintegration of each individual returnee as inadequate.320 Sudanese officials “blamed the 
Eritrean government for the lack of repatriation” and voiced frustration with its 
uncooperative attitude and inefficient screening process.321  
Speaking in the aftermath of the 1996 refoulement of 224 Eritreans, the head of 
the UNHCR mission in Asmara noted that, “they [Sudan] are rounding up people 
systematically. It is impossible to predict what will happen in the next few weeks or 
months…Anything could happen due to the strain between the Sudanese and Eritrean 
governments.”322 The reasons for Sudan’s refoulement of Eritrean refugees in 1996 are 
likely twofold. First, it was a way for the Sudanese government to display its frustration 
not only with the lack of funds dedicated to repatriation by the international community, 
but also with the financial burden it had incurred by the ongoing hosting of Eritrean 
refugees. Second, this act was a way for Sudan to display its disapproval of Eritrean 
government policies generally, as well as specifically regarding the repatriation process. 
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Over the ensuing years Eritrea hosted a number of Sudanese opposition meetings 
and conferences, and Sudan continued to support the EJM.323 Between 1997 and 1999, 
Sudan and Eritrea launched accusations of cross border raids, amassing of troops in 
border regions, and Eritrea accused Sudan of plotting an assassination attempt on the 
Eritrean president.324 Despite an agreement signed in May 1999 following negotiations 
for improved relations in Qatar, no steps were taken to follow through with the agreement 
and relations further deteriorated.325 
6.2.2 The Twenty-First Century: A Slow Road to Rapprochement 
In 2000 the two governments took steps to improve relations. The route between 
their borders was reopened, the NDA was forced to leave the Sudanese Embassy in 
Asmara, and the two governments agreed that they would cease allowing opposition 
groups based in either country to launch cross-border attacks or raids on the home 
country.326 This restoration of relations was rocky at best and between 2000 and 2002, 
despite both countries voicing a desire work toward rapprochement, both governments 
continued to launch accusations of rebel and opposition support at one another.327  
In 2001 the governments managed to come together to coordinate another 
repatriation program for Eritrean refugees in Sudan to return home.328 This scheme was 
marred with roadblocks from the start though, and by October 2002 Sudan closed its 
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border with Eritrea after accusing the country of supporting rebels.329 By late 2003 Sudan 
agreed to reopen a “humanitarian corridor” through which repatriating refugees could 
enter Eritrea.330 
 A genuine détente between Asmara and Khartoum did not emerge until 2005. 
With the 2005 signing of the CPA, Eritrea lessened its involvement with the SPLA/M 
and focused on its support for smaller rebel movements in Sudan. 331 Eritrea then used 
these relationships to facilitate peace talks between the NCP and these groups.332 In 2006 
Eritrea coordinated negotiations for and the signing of the Eastern Sudan Peace 
Agreement.333 This ended a decade of sporadic conflict between the Government of 
Sudan and the Eastern Front, a coalition of rebel groups based near Sudan’s border with 
Eritrea.334  
 An Eritrean journalist named Aaron Berhane who fled to Sudan in 2001 noted 
that, “with the normalization of relations between the Sudan and Eritrea since 2005, the 
situation [for Eritrean refugees] is moving backward instead of forward.”335 Human 
Rights Watch found that this 2005 improvement in relations caused Sudan to put 
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increased pressure on Eritrean refugees to return to Eritrea over the subsequent years.336 
This pressure came to a head with Sudan’s forceful return of over 500 Eritrean refugees 
and asylum-seekers throughout 2007. One 2007 victim of refoulement, Tsigab Angosom, 
recounted that he faced immediate detention upon return to Eritrea and was a victim of 
torture during his nine-month incarceration.337  
 In December 2007 diaspora-based Eritrean opposition and human rights groups 
alleged that the Sudanese and Eritrean governments were working in conjunction to 
forcibly return Eritrean refugees. The Eritrean Research and Documentation Center 
claims to have an Eritrean government source that has confirmed that Eritrean 
intelligence agents enter Sudan and kidnap Eritrean refugees.338 Also speaking in 
December 2007, Ethiopia-based Eritrean Kunama Democratic Front members alleged 
that 4,000 Eritrean refugees in Sudan had been secretly loaded into vehicles be Eritrean 
authorities and forcibly returned to their home country over the previous weeks.339 These 
echo similar claims made by Human Rights Watch in 2009; speaking in the context of 
forcible returns of Eritrean refugees, the organization noted that “Sudanese security 
services have links to Eritrean security agents.”340 Although it is difficult to confirm the 
validity of these allegations, Sudan’s June 2008 announcement that all Eritrean 
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opposition groups working within the country were to end their activities and close 
offices, provides a case for increased Sudanese cooperation with Eritrean authorities.341   
In a strong show of support for Sudan (and highlighting its own international 
isolation), Eritrea became the first country to invite President al-Bashir for an official 
visit following the International Criminal Court issuance of a warrant for his arrest.342 
The Sudanese Foreign Minister described Eritrea’s invitation as an act of “solidarity” 
with Sudan.343 In 2010 Eritrea played a mediating role in a ceasefire between Sudan and 
the Darfur-based Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), although the agreement was 
short-lived.344 President Afwerki made an official visit to Sudan in October 2011 and the 
next week he and President al-Bashir met near their border to mark the commencement of 
construction on a new road intersecting the two countries.345 
It was in the wave of these increasingly warm relations between the two 
governments that in 2011 over 350 Eritrean asylum-seekers and refugees were refouled. 
The UNHCR has noted that it prevented further acts of refoulement during 2011 through 
“advocacy, monitoring of prisons, and legal representation in court.”346An Eritrean 
journalist who fled her country and sought refuge in Sudan in 2011 described, “no one 
can tell where the Eritrean authority stops and that of the Sudan starts.”347 This echoes 
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previously mentioned claims made in 2007 of increased cooperation between Sudanese 
and Eritrean security apparatuses in the forcible return of Eritrean refugees. 
6.3 Eritrean Asylees and the International Refugee Regime 
 The Eritrean case also reflects and represents a number of issues with the 
international refugee regime and its practical application. Specifically this case highlights 
problems with the law’s implementation mechanisms, burden sharing, and durable 
solutions. UNHCR is the body charged with implementation of and the responsibility to 
oversee state practice of international refugee law.348 Despite this mandate, due to a lack 
of funds, perhaps too widespread a practical authority, and the absence of an “external 
supervisory mechanism” for the 1951 Convention, UNHCR does not have the power to 
or means to truly hold states accountable to the law.349 In this case study, there were 
several instances when Sudan refouled Eritreans despite UNHCR condemnation or 
attempts to intervene on behalf of asylees. For example major deportations occurred in 
2011 even though UNHCR “consistently reminded Sudan of its obligations under 
international and Sudanese law”, and agreements had been made between UNHCR and 
government authorities that would-be deportees were to be screened by UNHCR before 
decisions were made about their forcible return.350 
 This case also highlights problems with international burden sharing and 
commitment to durable solutions for refugees. The “ultimate goal” of UNHCR is that 
durable solutions are found for refugees; that is, voluntarily repatriation to their home 
country, integration into the local population in their country of asylum, or resettlement 
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to a third country.351 For Eritreans in Sudan, some of who are presently second or third 
generation refugees, the international refugee regime has thus far failed to provide these 
solutions. The egregious and widespread nature of the Eritrean government’s human 
rights abuses make repatriation an unviable option for the vast majority of refugees. The 
USDS currently designates Sudan as an unsafe country for refugees, as there exists no 
mechanisms for protection of these populations within the State, and as Sudanese law 
does not allow refugees to naturalize, local integration is also not possible.352 Therefore, 
resettlement is the only realistic option for Eritrean refugees in Sudan, however thus far it 
has not occurred on any notable scale. As was previously mentioned in this chapter, the 
number of individuals resettled from Sudan’s overall refugee population in recent years 
has been in the low 100s.353 Due to a lack of physical and financial burden sharing on the 
part of the international community, there is currently a major shortage of resettlement 
positions available in safe third countries.354  
 In 2008 Sudan requested additional funding from UNHCR, saying that it simply 
did not have the means to cope with or provide aid to the large numbers of Eritrean 
refugees in its country.355 The widespread nature of Sudan’s refoulement of Eritreans in 
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available places.” There 2011 projections for resettlement needs surpassed 805,000, 
however the overall quota of slots provided by states was 80,000. UNHCR, “UNHCR 
highlights shortage of resettlement places,” news, UNHCR, July 5, 2010, 
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355 Reuters, “Sudan asks U.N. for aid for Eritrean, Somali refugees,” Reuters, December 
22, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/22/us-sudan-refugees-
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recent years and especially its practice of deterring would be asylum-seekers at the border 
(that is, arresting them upon arrival and charging them with illegal entry without allowing 
them access to asylum procedures) may be as much a representation of Sudan’s 
frustration with the international community’s approach to refugee solutions, as it is a 
form of cooperation between Sudan and Eritrea. The 1996 act can be understood in much 
the same way, as it came on the heels of an unsuccessful repatriation program that failed 
in part because of a lack of international donations. 
 As more Eritrean asylum-seekers and refugees leave Sudan (voluntarily or as a 
result of trafficking), the plight of Eritreans is taking on more international dimensions. 
In 2011 alone, 17,175 Eritreans crossed the border from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula into 
Israel and their testimonies often included accounts of kidnapping and trafficking by 
smugglers from Sudan.356 Libya, Egypt, Malta, and Italy have all experienced an increase 
in Eritreans seeking asylum in recent years as well.357 As a primary entry point for 
Europe, Italy reported a 50% spike in the number of Eritrean asylum-seekers it saw 
between 2007 and 2008.358  
 It is reasonable to believe that the majority of these Eritreans spent some amount 
of time in Sudan before seeking refuge or better and safer opportunities elsewhere. 
Bariagaber and Kibreab have noted that most Eritrean refugees currently in Sudan – both 
those who fled their country pre- and post-independence – were unwilling to return due to 
the country’s deteriorating political climate, but were also “disinterested in spending even 
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356 Humphris, 1. 
357 HRW, Service for Life, 65-73. 
358 Ibid., 66. 
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a single day in Sudan.”359 Statistics clearly reflect these sentiments; recall that in chapter 
4 it was noted that 98% of the total Eritrean refugee population worldwide was in 
Sudan.360 By 2011, that number had decreased to 46%.361 With Sudan’s unwillingness 
and/or inability to offer sufficient protection to Eritrean refugees, there is a great need for 
international responses that ensure that this population is granted its due human rights 
and protection in Sudan and elsewhere.  
6.4 Conclusion 
 As in the case of Ethiopia, this analysis has also found a significant nexus 
between Sudan’s refugee policy and bilateral relations in the case of Eritrea. Unlike with 
Ethiopia, relations between Sudan and Eritrea were very poor throughout most of the 
period of this study. There was only one case of refoulement reported in the 1990s and 
due to the context in which it occurred, Sudan was clearly using the refugees it refouled 
as objects of policy through which to communicate a message of discontent or 
contentment with their home government. As relations between the two states improved 
dramatically between 2005 and 2011, refoulement of Eritreans became widespread. 
These acts often occurred amid meeting and agreements of cooperation between Sudan 
and Eritrea, and there are reports that the security apparatuses of the two states work in 
conjunction to forcibly return refugees. 
 The Eritrean case, more so than that of Ethiopia, also highlights significant 
problems related to enforcement mechanisms, burden sharing, and durable solutions 
                                                
359 Bariagaber, Conflict and the Refugee Experience, 147; Kibreab, “Urban Eritrean 
Refugees in Sudan,” 136. 
360 See footnote 104 in chapter 4. 
361 UNHCR, Global Trends, 2011, 43. 
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within the international refugee regime. In some instances acts of refoulement represent 
Sudan’s desperation as it struggles with shortcomings of this broader system. The 
international community’s lack of dedication to shouldering the global South’s refugee 
burden and specifically dedicating themselves to finding durable solutions for Sudan’s 
Eritrean refugee population are in many ways deeply linked with Sudan’s violation of the 






 This thesis has viewed Sudan’s refugee policy vis-à-vis the cases of Ethiopian-
Sudanese and Eritrean-Sudanese bilateral relations between 1991 and 2011. This was 
done in order to determine the impact that these relations had on Sudan’s practice of 
refouling asylees from the two states. It was found that there exists a clear nexus between 
Sudan’s bilateral relations and the acts of refoulement that it has exercised in these cases. 
Prior to beginning this study I had heard a number of Ethiopians and Eritreans describe 
this problem saying, “when relations are bad between the countries, refugees are treated 
good”, and vice versa. Such statements are an over-generalization and simplification of 
the situation, however, and the nexus between the two does not always fall within this 
strict dichotomy. Karadawi’s determination that Sudan often used refugees as “objects of 
policy” in the pre-1991 context is still largely applicable today.362 In different instances 
during the period of this study Sudan used refoulement of Ethiopian and Eritrean asylum-
seekers and refugees as a policy tactic through which to show solidarity and cooperation, 
as well as discontent and disapproval with their home governments.  
 In some instances due to the widespread and seemingly random nature of 
deportations, Sudan’s acts may also be understood as a way for the government to send a 
message to the international community about its inability and/or unwillingness to house 
large populations of refugees as it has for decades. In that way, Sudan’s actions are in line 
with wider trends being seen throughout the global South, as the international refugee 
regime’s current implementation fails to adequately address the needs of refugee-
                                                
362 See above note 47. Karadawi, Refugee Policy in Sudan, 44. 
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receiving states or shoulder their share of the burden or ensure the safety of refugees 
within those states. 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
 In this sub-section I will review the primary findings based on the two case 
studies. Several conclusions can be reached about the nature of refoulement in the 
Ethiopian case. Aside from a short period of poor relations between 1995 and 1998, 
Khartoum and Addis Ababa have had cooperative and at times, friendly, relations. The 
majority of cases of refoulement of Ethiopians appear to have been the result of specific 
targeting of refugees who were political opponents of the EPRDF. Compared with the 
Eritrean case, there were fewer forcible returns of Ethiopian refugees and asylum-seekers 
who had been the victims of random round-ups. There were also few reported cases of 
Ethiopians being detained upon arrival, charged with illegal entry into Sudan, and 
refouled before having the opportunity to request asylum. An exception to this was in 
1996, when relations had recently worsened between Sudan and Ethiopia, and a number 
of Ethiopian asylees were randomly rounded up and returned. These were not specifically 
targeted individuals who were wanted by the Ethiopian authorities. This act is understood 
as a means through which Sudan indirectly displayed its negative sentiments toward 
Ethiopia. 
 The Eritrean case differs in many ways from that of Ethiopia, however this study 
found that even then, Sudan used Eritrean asylum-seekers and refugees as tools of policy. 
Aside from one instance of refoulement that occurred when relations were poor between 
Sudan and Eritrea, and served as a means for Sudan to voice disdain for Eritrean 
government actions, all other reported cases took place during a period of rapprochement.  
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Though more Eritreans who are refouled were victims of random round ups, as opposed 
to the apparent direct targeting that was seen in many Ethiopian cases, some reports still 
linked these acts to cooperation between Sudan and Eritrea. 
7.2 What do these findings say about the international refugee regime? 
 
 One of my secondary research questions was regarding the shortcomings and 
problems with realistic implementation of the international refugee regime based on the 
findings of this thesis. In the analyses of the two cases tackled, several key issues 
representing or rooted in wider problems with the international refugee regime were 
raised. Generally these problems reaffirm broad issues that have already been noted by 
other scholars. 
 One primary issue that is central to the issue of refoulement in general is that few 
mechanisms exist to ensure that states abide by the tenets of international refugee law. 
Although in several instances UNHCR successfully advocated on behalf of would-be 
forced returnees, there were a number of other acts of refoulement that occurred despite 
UNHCR condemnation. At other points, the Sudanese government deported refugees and 
asylum-seekers despite having agreed with UNHCR that they would be given the 
opportunity to access legal asylum procedures. UNHCR has the mandate to urge 
governments to abide by the 1951 Convention and can condemn acts that violate the law, 
however it does not have the power to enforce refugee law standards. 
 The case of Eritrean refugees specifically reflects problems with the international 
community’s dedication to burden sharing and durable solutions. A lack of funds from 
donors has financially burdened Sudan in its housing of this large refugee population. 
Unable to return to Eritrea or live safely in Sudan and due to an insufficient number of 
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slots for resettlement, this population has been left in a desperate and vulnerable position. 
This has pushed many Eritreans (as well as Ethiopians) to seek other forms of refuge 
abroad.  
 At the time of writing in November 2012 six Eritreans and four Ethiopians have 
been refouled by Sudan during the year.363 An additional forty-one were charged with 
illegal entry and sentenced to deportation, but requested access to UNHCR. It is not clear 
whether the opportunity to pursue asylum procedures was granted.364 These incidents will 
likely not decrease unless the bilateral relations-refugee policy nexus is more seriously 
explored and steps are taken to promote a less politicized implementation of international 
refugee law. Equally pressing are the needs to take genuine international commitment to 
address burden sharing and durable solutions for refugees. Though this thesis has studied 
these issues within the Sudanese context, the findings reflect broader trends and practices 
carried out by governments worldwide. Therefore, not only regionally, but internationally 
these issues must be tackled to protect and extend human rights to some of the world’s 
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APPENDIX 3 
INTERVIEW SUMMARY: GIRMA 
The following is a summary of relevant findings based on an interview with Girma 
(pseudonym) that took place on August 9, 2012 at the office of an NGO in Cairo, Egypt. 
The interview lasted forty-nine minutes and was conducted in English. The interviewee’s 
verbal consent was accepted after I discussed the tenets of ‘Appendix II: Consent Form’ 
with him and informed consent was gained to audio record the session. I conducted an 
open ended interview during which I asked about trends in Sudan’s treatment and 
deportation of refugees based on Girma’s personal experiences as a refugee in the 
country, as well as his close contact with other members of Cairo’s Ethiopian refugee 
community. I also sought to gain his personal opinion and framing of Sudanese-Ethiopian 
relations as they impact Ethiopian refugees. 
 
 Girma fled his home country of Ethiopia in 1988 in order to evade compulsory 
military service under the Derg Regime. He describes that at this time there were many 
fronts of battle against the Eritreans and the TPLF, and reflects, “I have many, many 
friends who went there and never returned. I missed many things by becoming a refugee, 
but I have saved my life.” Girma fled to Sudan in 1988, was granted refugee status, and 
stayed in exile in the country until 1996. He eventually came to Egypt where he works 
with a refugee assistance organization and is active in the local Ethiopian community.  
 During the interview he primarily discussed the changing nature of the Sudanese 
government’s treatment of Ethiopian refugees who were members of Ethiopian 
opposition parties, specifically of the EPRP. Our discussion focused mainly on the early 
1990s while he personally witnessed and lived these Sudanese policies. 
 He described that generally when relations were good between Sudan and Ethiopia, 
politically active Ethiopian refugees faced a high possibility of targeting by Ethiopian 
forces that were permitted to operate in Sudan. He provided some detailed accounts to 
demonstrate this and said this was an overwhelmingly trend prior to 1996. He claimed 
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that when relations worsened between the countries, Sudan permitted Ethiopian political 
opposition groups to have offices open in Sudan and operate freely. It was his 
understanding that these actions were Sudan’s way of avoiding direct confrontation with 
Ethiopia and said that Ethiopian refugees were “pawns” or “proxies” in Sudan’s political 
games. 
 When questioned about other factors that may be influencing Sudan’s treatment 
of Ethiopian refugees he cited several domestic issues. He described that generally he felt 
that the Sudanese population mistrusted Ethiopian refugees and saw them as hostile. The 
Sudanese associated these individuals with the Derg Regime, which would often fly 
fighter jets into Sudanese air space in power flexing routines. While in Sudan, Sudanese 
citizens would accuse Girma and his country of wanting war with them. Another issue at 
the national level that trickled down into the local population’s psyche was that of the 
Blue Nile water. He described that Sudanese taxi drivers would accuse him of wanting to 
collect all the water so that none could flow into Sudan. He also spent much time 
discussing what he understood to be an Islamic threat from Sudan toward predominantly 
Christian Ethiopia. 
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APPENDIX  4 
INTERVIEW SUMMARY: DANIEL 
The following is a summary of relevant findings based on an interview with Daniel 
(pseudonym) that took place on August 30, 2012 at a café in Cairo, Egypt. The interview 
lasted approximately three hours. I communicated with Daniel through an Amharic 
interpreter who gave a personal statement of confidentiality prior to the official start of 
the interview. The interviewee’s verbal consent was accepted after I discussed the 
Consent Form with him. He explained that he preferred not to be audio recorded because 
he feared that the presence of a recording device might attract unwanted attention, 
specifically from Egyptian authorities. 
 
I had already met Daniel on several occasions a year prior to this interview, however I 
was directed to him by a gatekeeper within the Ethiopian community for purposes of this 
study. Therefore, the interview environment was very comfortable and informal, as an 
element of trust and familiarity existed between Daniel and myself prior to the interview. 
Daniel gave an in-depth summary of his experiences as a politically active Ethiopian 
refugee in Sudan, which partially covered events that occurred prior to 1991. 
  
 Daniel was recruited as a young man to distribute flyers and deliver documents 
amongst members of the EPRP in his home country of Ethiopia. He officially became a 
member of the party in 1980, but was forced into hiding due to the Derg Regime’s 
targeting of EPRP members. He eventually fled to Sudan, where he was granted refugee 
status upon arrival in 1983. EPRP offices openly operated in Sudan at the time of his 
arrival and so he continued to serve as an active member of the party. He eventually fled 
to Egypt in 2005 after facing ongoing fear and threats of refoulement to Ethiopia because 
of his political affiliations. 
 Daniel provided detailed accounts of Sudan’s treatment of Ethiopian refugees based 
on his firsthand experiences. He focused primarily on the circumstances of EPRP 
members, though Daniel noted that the TPLF, EPLF, Ethiopian Democratic Union 
(EDU), and OLF were also operating in Sudan at the time of his arrival in the country. 
 98 
The EPRP and other Ethiopian opposition parties were permitted to operate openly when 
Daniel arrived in 1983 while President el-Nimeiry was ruling Sudan. This changed when 
Saddiq al-Mahdi came to power after the coup that ousted el-Nimeiry. Daniel described 
that because of an agreement made between al-Mahdi and the Derg Regime, Sudan 
agreed to stop supporting the Eritrean liberation movements active in its country. In 
reality the offices of all Ethiopian opposition parties – including the EPRP – were closed 
down by force.  
 Quite soon after Omar al-Bashir came to power, Ethiopian opposition parties were 
once again permitted to operate. Daniel noticed however that EPRP members were not 
given the same freedom of movement and treatment that EPLF and TPLF members were 
given.  Immediately after the EPRDF took power in Ethiopia in 1991 the Sudanese 
authorities cracked down on EPRP activities. Daniel claims that deportations of refugees 
were never an issue in Sudan prior to 1991, but after that time became common. These 
deportations, which he called “kidnappings,” occurred through Ethiopian and Sudanese 
security collaboration. He claims that Ethiopian officials would give the names of those 
refugees who they wanted returned, but it was Sudanese authorities who would come to 
their homes (usually at night and in secrecy) to take these individuals and hand them 
across the border to Ethiopian officials. Because of this, from 1991 until 1995 all EPRP 
activity in Sudan took place underground. 
 In 1995 following the assassination attempt on President Mubarak, the Sudanese 
government allowed the EPRP and other parties to carry out their actions freely. This 
continued until the end of 1998 when he described that a sort of peace treaty was signed 
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between Sudan and Ethiopia. At this point all EPRP operations were forcibly shut down 
and again, the group carried out their operations in secrecy.  
 Sudanese government targeting and deportations of Ethiopian refugees, including 
those involved in many different opposition parties, has continued since that time. Daniel 
described the late 1990s and new millennium as the “worst period” for Ethiopian 
refugees in Sudan and he witnessed many refugees fleeing the country to seek asylum 
elsewhere. Daniel played an active role in organizing and taking part in hunger strikes 
and protests against the enactment of the “ceased circumstances” clause in the early 
2000s. He served as a liaison between the Ethiopian refugee community and UNHCR (as 
he had done at various points in the past), however he said that the UNHCR’s response to 
refugee detentions and forced returns was often that the organization could not do 
anything about Sudanese government policy. Though his case was reviewed and his 
refugee status extended, he decided to flee Sudan to Egypt when he received warnings 
from a Sudanese government official with whom he had friendly relations that there were 
plans to deport him. 
 Though he showed the UNHCR Cairo office proof of his recognized refugee status 
in Sudan when he arrived here in 2005, this status was not extended to him here. Even 
after presenting his case, he was told that he can return to Sudan and live there safely. He 
is so certain of the dangerous circumstances he would face in Sudan if he returned that he 
has chosen instead to live illegally and without UNHCR or Egyptian government 
protection here. 
 It is Daniel’s understanding that Sudan benefits from this collaboration with the 
Ethiopian government of returning refugees who are wanted political opponents. From a 
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security standpoint, in the past the Ethiopian government cracked down on the activities 
of the SPLA/M in its territory. More recently the Ethiopian government has mediated for 
and sent peacekeeping troops to Sudan. Economically, the two countries have also 
collaborated. For example, Ethiopia transports many good through Sudan, from which 
Sudan reaps financial benefits. 
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